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 ABSTRACT 
Already one of the most impoverished countries in the world, Guyana’s economy 
is experiencing a downward spiral under IMF and World Bank structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs), which ironically, were designed to boost the economy.  This claim is 
analyzed with respect to three of Guyana’s most important industries: logging, mining 
and sugar. 
 However, while SAPs have been a major force in influencing Guyana’s recent 
development path, the nation’s colonial inheritance must also be considered.   
Specifically, this legacy set the conditions under which Guyana’s two major political 
parties, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and the People’s National Congress (PNC), 
both claiming to be adherents to socialism, came to power.  Their policies and actions, 
influenced by the colonial inheritance, eventually led to Guyana’s adoption of austerity 
measures designed by the international financial institutions (IFIs).  This analysis 
therefore begins with an examination of the rise of these two dominant political parties, 
the role of colonialism in their emergence and the impact their actions and policies have 
had in laying the foundations for SAPs.   It then turns to examining specifically the 
effects of SAPs on three major areas of the economy, logging, mining and sugar. 
 This study is significant because it draws attention to the problems associated 
with SAPs.  While structural adjustment has become a widely accepted form of financial 
assistance over the past two decades, upon closer examination, its negative effects far 
outweigh the positive ones.  Therefore, SAPs should be better tailored to the specifics of 
Guyana’s economy.   
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 CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
 
 
Known as the land where Sir Walter Raleigh sought the legendary golden city of 
El Dorado, Guyana (earlier called British Guiana) is famous for its precious mineral 
resources, valuable timber and sugar.  Guyana is actually an Amerindian word meaning 
Land of Many Waters. Called British Guiana during the time of colonialism, the country 
was officially renamed Guyana upon receiving independence in 1966.  In 1970, it became 
a republic within the Commonwealth. 
Today, however, despite its riches, it is one of the poorest and most 
underdeveloped countries in the Western hemisphere and in the world.  This is not a new 
development, as Guyana’s economy and society have suffered detrimentally since the 
time of colonialism, and continued to deteriorate under the policies and programs of 
successive national governments.  Structural adjustment programs prescribed for Guyana 
for over 20 years by International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order to alter the downturns in the 
economy have only exacerbated the problems.   
The objective of this study is to examine the various structural adjustment 
packages, namely the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (EHIPC) and to 
analyze their impact on the Guyanese economy.  Specifically, the analysis will 
concentrate on three of Guyana’s major industries: logging, mining and sugar and the 
Guyanese economy to demonstrate how structural adjustment policies (SAPs) have 
aggravated the nation’s developmental problems.  Further, the analysis will be placed 
within the context of Guyana’s colonial past as this history helped to create the conditions 
that led to the eventual implementation of SAPs.   
To achieve its aim, this thesis is organized into four chapters, including the 
introduction (chapter 1) and conclusion (chapter 4).  The Introduction (chapter 1) 
addresses the aim, importance, and layout of the thesis.   
Chapter 2 examines Guyana’s historical context from the time of British 
colonialism.  This is important to understanding the political occurrences that paved the 
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 way for SAPs.  It points out how the actions of the British led to the formation Guyana’s 
first political party, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), which espoused the principles 
of Marxism, an ideology antithetical to the interests of Britain and its Western allies.  
Internal divisions with this party, which were in large part exacerbated by the British and 
Americans and exploited racial divisions, led to the formation of a second major political 
party, the socialist People’s National Congress (PNC).  The corrupt actions of this last 
political party, while seemingly intended to alleviate Guyana’s severe underdevelopment, 
in fact worsened its dependent status, and actually paved the way for the introduction of 
structural adjustment measures.   Ironically, despite both parties’ commitment to 
socialism, their economic positions deviated from this path, as evidenced by their 
endorsement of structural adjustment policies.   
This historical explanation above assists greatly with the premise of Chapter 3, 
which outlines the specifics of each of the structural adjustment programs implemented in 
Guyana.  In turn, the general effects of these programs are discussed, but more 
importantly, their effects on the logging, mining, and sugar industries are examined.  
Also discussed are some positive reforms for alleviating the negative effects of SAPs in 
each of these industries.  Finally, chapter 4, the Conclusion, is forward looking and 
discusses future implications of this research.  
   
Methodology 
 
 The methodology used in this thesis is qualitative in nature.  It involves the use of 
both primary and secondary materials.  The former includes information put forth by 
various national and international agencies, including the relevant ministries in the 
Guyanese government, the reports of NGO’s and the publications of the World Bank and 
IMF.  The latter includes books, government publications, journal and newspaper articles.   
 The literature linking externally directed and domestically initiated policies and 
programs to underdevelopment in Guyana are limited.  Therefore, this thesis seeks to 
make a contribution to the academic studies on this topic.  The lack of this research could 
lead to a failure to correct the ills imposed by structural adjustment, thus further 
exacerbating Guyana’s underdevelopment.                                                                   
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 CHAPTER TWO—ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF GUYANA  
                                       
Introduction                                                                                                                           
 
 While this thesis analyzes the effects of structural adjustment on Guyana’s 
economy, the foundations for this underdevelopment lie in Guyana’s colonial and post- 
independence political occurrences.  It is a history, according to Deonandan, which was 
“dictated by the imperatives of colonialism, imperialism, racism and oppression.”1 
 In this chapter, the objective is to describe the historical, economic as well as 
political development in an effort to provide an understanding of the context within 
which SAPs were enacted.  (Chapter 3, the core of this thesis, discusses the specific 
details of these policies and their effects on the Guyanese economy).  The focus here will 
be on two groups:  the colonial powers, Britain and the US, and the two major political 
parties which have dominated the country, the Peoples Progressive Party, the PPP (now 
the PPP/Civic) and the Peoples National Congress the PNC (now PNC/Reform), as well 
as their respective leaders.  The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that aspects of 
British colonialism were very damaging to the Guyanese economy and society.2  Britain 
controlled Guyana’s major industry at the time, sugar, and used its dominance to exploit 
African and Indian labour. Further, this chapter will also discuss how colonial policies 
laid the foundations for racial tensions, which in turn exacerbated Guyana’s 
developmental problems.                                                                                                   
 The latter part of the chapter takes an inward focus and discusses the emergence 
of Guyana’s two major political forces, the PPP and the PNC, parties which arose from 
the people’s struggles to win independence and end exploitation, as well the influence of 
worldwide subscriptions to socialism as a means to end inherited colonial ills.  What 
becomes evident, however, is that the fate of these two parties was largely dictated by 
colonial meddling.  Further, the machinations of both the PPP and PNC, such as their 
exploitation of the race issue also aggravated the nation’s economic development 
                                                 
1 Kalowatie Deonandan, “Guyana’s PPP: From Socialism to National Democracy,” in From Revolutionary 
Movements to Political Parties: Cases from Latin America and Africa, eds., Kalowatie Deonandan, David 
Close and Gary Prevost. (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 109.  
2 Any positive contributions of British colonialism are not the focus in this thesis.   
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 dilemmas, giving rise to the conditions that led to intervention by the World Bank and the 
IMF in the form of SAPs.   
 
British Colonialism   
 
 Since the time of colonialism, Guyana has served Britain’s economic interests.  
This nation was initially brought into the world economy as a supplier of raw materials, 
in particular sugar.  Initially, black slaves were brought from Africa to work in the sugar 
plantations.  When slavery was abolished in 1834, Indians from India, Britain’s largest 
colony, were brought over to work as indentured laborers in the plantations.  While this 
form of serfdom was deemed less brutal, it was in actuality another form of slavery.   
 While the aim of the British initially was to allocate labourers for its sugar 
plantations, its policies to control and subjugate these labourers led to the creation of a 
society divided by race.3  These two groups were therefore brought to Guyana to serve 
European interests and needs.  Guyana’s unique racial makeup was thus determined 
during the colonial era, and has been a major influence in its development.  According to 
Guyanese scholar Ralph Premdas:  
The foundations of inter-ethnic rivalry were forged on the anvil of the colonial 
policy of immigration and divide-and-rule.  There is no evidence of any sort of 
inherent antipathy among the imported immigrants.  It was, however, the manner 
in which colonial society was organized, stratified, and exploited that triggered 
and sustained inter-communal fears and rivalries.4  
   
For instance, there were “differences over wages between racial groups on the 
sugar estates, brought about by the deliberate policy of the [white] planters of playing one 
group off against another.”5  The planters made cultural concessions to the East Indians 
                                                 
3 Some authors use the word ‘race’ while others use the term ‘ethnicity.’ In the literature, these two words 
often mean the same thing.  In keeping with this and in the interest of simplicity, for the purposes of this 
thesis, I will use the words race and ethnicity synonymously. 
4 Ralph Premdas, “Race and Ethnic Relations in Burnhamite Guyana” in Across the Dark Waters:  
Ethnicity and Indian Identity in the Caribbean, eds., D. Dabydeen and B. Samaroo  (Warwick University 
Caribbean Studies, London: Macmillan Caribbean, 1996), 46, quoted in, Marcus Colchester, Guyana 
Fragile Frontier: Loggers, Miners and Forest Peoples  (Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997), 28.  It 
should be noted that some alternative theories assert that ethnic divisions are indeed inherent. 
5 Quoted in Rupert Lewis, Walter Rodney’s Intellectual and Political Thought (Kingston, Jamaica: The 
University of the West Indies Press, 1998), 198.   
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 in order to intensify their isolation and make them easier to subjugate.6   By allowing 
them to eat their own food with spices brought from India, and maintain their marriage 
customs and religious practices,7 they were lured into a false sense of security that gave 
the planters more power over them.  In other words, since the Indians were provided with 
the comforts of home, they were more likely to feel compelled to obey the planters.      
Due to the strategies of the colonial powers, the Africans and East Indians 
developed as separate societies.  The East Indians believed that the Africans did not 
embrace any traditions or heritage, while the Africans regarded the East Indians as 
ignorant people who performed the tasks no longer acceptable to the Africans.  In 
essence, both groups had little respect for each other and maintained little contact with 
one another.8  Today, this division is still reflected in all aspects of Guyanese life, but 
most visibly in the political sphere.  In spite of growing racial diversity (Guyana has six 
official ethnic groups), descendants of Indians and Africans form the dominant groups.  
 This racial makeup is still exploited by political leaders and international players 
who wish to employ the divide and rule principle, much to the detriment of the nation.9  
According to the most recent data, the ethnic composition of Guyanese society is as 
follows:  43.4% East Indians (Indo-Guyanese), 30.2% African Guyanese (Afro-
Guyanese), 16.7 Mixed, 9.2% Amerindians, 1% Chinese and 0.3% Other.10  Therefore, 
while Guyana may be a land of ‘six peoples’, its society is divided primarily between the 
two dominant groups—Indo and Afro-Guyanese.   As has occurred in several other 
societies, such human exploitation created a drive within the populace for a method of 
self-rule.  This would lead to the formation of first the PPP and then the PNC.  Ironically 
these two groups had similar ideological origins as they were once united, but became 
divided in large part due to colonial machinations.  Their divisions and conflicts greatly 
contributed to Guyana’s status as one of the hemisphere’s poorest countries.    
                                                 
6 Thomas Spinner, Jr., A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945-1983 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1984), 8.    
7 Janet Naidu, “Indian Women of Guyana: Reflections of their Existence, Survival and Representation,” 
Guyana Journal, http://www.guyanajournal.com/women_gy.html (Accessed August 1, 2007).  
8 Spinner, 7-8.   
9 There are some who argue that the political parties are solely responsible for manipulating ethnicity, and 
that the colonial history has no bearing on current ethnic problems. 
10 Quoted in Deonandan, “Guyana’s PPP,” 110.   
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 The formation of the PPP, which is discussed in more detail in the following 
section, was largely influenced by the development of the sugar economy in colonial 
times.  For example, in 1904, four firms, all headquartered in the UK, controlled 80 
percent of Guyana’s sugar industry.11   Therefore, transnational corporations had replaced 
the white planters from colonial times.  The existence of these corporations allowed for 
constitutional changes, which in turn led to an increase in the colonial powers’ 
confrontation of the growing middle class and increasingly articulate labour force.12   
  
The PPP: Ideology, Policy and Consequences   
 
The emergence of the PPP is an important step in the development of Guyana 
because it was essentially Guyana’s first effort to assert itself politically and confront its 
subservience to colonial powers.   The actual formation of the PPP was influenced by the 
aforementioned British-controlled exploitative sugar economy, the resulting rebellions 
and the formation of unions, and the spread of socialism in the developing world.  
Following World War I, and especially after World War II, socialist parties increased in 
number worldwide.13     
In Guyana, this trend began with the 1905 riot by rebellious sugar workers.  This 
led to the emergence of a labour union14 called the British Guiana Labour Union, 
founded in 1919. The focus of this organization was to improve the plight of the working 
class by demanding legislation to increase wages and improve work hours and 
conditions.15  They also capitalized on the ongoing socialist trend that by calling for the 
creation of a socialist state in their very first constitution.  They accomplished this amidst
provocations by the colonial rulers and the sugar companies.  These strides were the
impetus for future legislation regarding minimum wages, workers’ compensation and the 
 
 
                                                
right to organize.16 
 
11 Colchester, Guyana: Fragile Frontier, 28.   
12 Colchester, Guyana: Fragile Frontier, 28.   
13 “Socialism,” http://www.questia.com/library/politics-and-government/socialism-in-america.jsp 
(Accessed November 11, 2006). 
14 The words ‘labour union’ and ‘trade union’ are used interchangeably throughout the paper.   
15 Colchester, Guyana: Fragile Frontier, 29.   
16 Colchester, Guyana: Fragile Frontier, 29.   
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  The trade union was the impetus that brought Cheddi Jagan, the East Indian s
of a sugar estate foreman, and eventual founder of the PPP to the fore of Guyanese 
politics.  In 1943, together with other middle-class radicals, he formed the Political 
Affairs Committee (PAC), which was a quasi-political organization that espoused a 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.  Following the PAC, Jagan founded the Guiana Indus
Workers Union (GIWU) in 1945 to mediate on behalf of the exploited East Indian suga
plantation workers.  His objective in founding the GIWU was to create a radical 
alternative to the existing trade unions in the country such as the Man Power Citizens 
Association (MPCA), which he saw as being conservative and geared more to protecting
the interests of the sugar plantation owners rather than the workers.
on 
trial 
r 
 
  The 
owever, translated into greater political mobilization via the 
creation  for 
e peoples of 
e 
en 
y can 
l 
  Campaigning on a socialist 
                                                
17  While popular 
among the sugar workers, it did not win them bargaining rights until the 1970’s.18
popularity of the GIWU, h
 of new political parties, first the PPP, then the PNC, and the struggle
Guyanese independence.  
Adding to the effects of these organizations was the influence of the 
aforementioned post-WWII socialist trend.  While still under colonial rule, th
British Guiana participated in this movement by forming a socialist party called th
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in 1950. This party was co-founded by the 
aforementioned Cheddi Jagan, who also served as the party’s leader, and an Afro-
Guyanese, Forbes Burnham. The PPP’s ideological platform was based on Marxist 
principles.  This was described in Jagan’s 1966 treatise, The West on Trial, where he 
wrote that he longed to abolish the system of exploitation and poverty to encourage m
to be truly free.19  He strongly believed that “only socialism with a planned econom
bring an end to unemployment, underemployment, hunger, … insecurity…nationa
chauvinism, and racial and political discrimination.”20
platform in its first election in 1953, the PPP won.  This set the stage for colonial 
machinations in order to oust the party from power.  
 
17 Euclid Rose, Dependency and Socialism in the Modern Caribbean: Superpower Intervention in Guyana, 
Jamaica, and Grenada, 1970-1985  (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 163.   
18 Rose, 163.   
19 Quoted in Deonandan, “Guyana’s PPP,” 116.  
20 Quoted in Deonandan, “Guyana’s PPP,” 116.   
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   The PPP was in power for a mere 133 days before the British government 
suspended the Constitution and evicted this new government because of Jagan’s so-called 
radical f 
al to 
ll the 
tegy 
ade 
placing 
t 
”27  
 
lic Services 
Interna
                             
socialist politics.  In particular, according to Rose, the British did not approve o
the PPP’s “radical domestic program,” which included land and welfare state reforms, 
trade union legislation, and the removal of church control of the schools.21   
 Jagan’s declared commitment to Marxist/Leninist beliefs22 was detriment
Guyana’s relations with the U.S. and Britain because of the ongoing Cold War as we
fact that Cuba’s turn to communism heightened the sensitivities of the U.S. and Britain 
regarding the spread of socialism.23  In response, Britain “…introduced cold war 
definitions into the nationalist arena,”24 thus thwarting Jagan’s efforts at nationalist 
policy.  Additionally, the U.S. began to view Guyana’s political actions “from the prism 
of the cold war.”25  This presented the opportunity for the U.S. to utilize its “hegemonic 
and hemispheric role of American imperialism.”26  Part of the British and US stra
was to use its trade unions to undermine Jagan’s GIWU in Guyana.  Both countries’ tr
unionists channeled support to the MPCA in order to prevent the GIWU from re
it.  In fact, Serafina Romauldi, interamerican representative of the The American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a far righ
organization, stated that he so opposed Jagan’s subservience to the communist 
movement, that he did everything in his power “…strengthen the democratic trade union 
forces opposed to him (Jagan) and to expose Jagan’s pro-Communist activities.
Additionally, the CIA had infiltrated a United States Trade Union, the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and provided funds to
this organization so that it could become more involved in the Pub
tional (PSI) and then engage in a trade union recruiting drive in British Guiana.28 
                    
 Leadership, Legitimacy, and Populist Politics  
a: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), 146.   
3.   
21 Rose, 167. 
22 Anton Allahar, ed., Caribbean Charisma:  Reflections on
(Kingston, Jamaic
23 Allahar, 144.   
24 Allahar, 142.   
25 Allahar, 145.   
26 Allahar, 28.     
27 Spinner, 92.   
28 Spinner, 92-9
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 It has also been suggested that the British Governor had formed alliances with the upper 
and middle class Guyanese to orchestrate the ousting of Jagan.29  
 The electoral system was also manipulated to ensure the PPP was defeated at the 
ballot box.  According to Rabe, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations actually played 
a role in encouraging the British to devise a scheme to ensure that Jagan lost the elections 
scheduled for 1964.  Specifically, President Kennedy “asked the UK government (Brit
Labor Party) to change the voting system in British Guiana to proportional representation 
(PR) so as to unseat Jagan.”
ish 
cial 
 Jagan’s parliamentary strength was greater than his popular 
strength
e 1964 election, although the PPP had a higher percentage and 
all, 
 
ist outpost 
ests of 
                                                
30  In light of the racial composition of Guyana and the ra
voting pattern, PR would greatly aid in removing the Marxist PPP government from 
office.  This was because
.  For instance, in the 1961 elections, under the first-past-the-post system, the PPP 
won 57% of the seats based on 42.3% of the vote.  Therefore, PR, which was finally 
implemented in 1963, would diminish these discrepancies and produce a more accurate 
reflection of seats. 31     
Additionally, as recently released US State Department documents show, the CIA 
had funded demonstrations to undermine Jagan.32  Consequently, as a result of these 
various machinations, in th
total number of votes, Governor Sir Richard Loyt appointed the PNC along with a sm
white-supported conservative party (the United Force-UF) as the ruling government.  The
PNC then held on to power, through electoral manipulations and other forms of outright 
corruption until 1992.      
 The British government had further reasons for suspending the Constitution.  
They accused the PPP of inciting violence and attempting to create a commun
in the region.33  Additionally, two pivotal pieces of legislation led to the suspension of 
the Constitution.  Namely, they were the Rice Farmers Security of Tenure Bill and the 
Labor Relations Act.  According to Rose, these bills threatened the economic inter
 
Study of a Country which is not quite Least 
/iedg/publications/Guyana.pdf  (Accessed May 13, 2007). 
h Guiana: A Cold War Story  (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 
eonandan, “Guyana’s PPP,” 111. 
29 Rose, 169.   
30 Adrian P. Hewitt, “Guyana Sugar and EBA—The Case 
Developed,” London: Overseas Development Institute, 
http://www.odi.org.uk
31 Rose, 175.   
32 Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in Britis
University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 6. 
33 Quoted in D
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 the local propertied, professional, and administrative middle class, as well as the 
metropolitan interests.34  In particular, the Rice Farmers Bill contained a provision that 
protected East Indian farmers from rent increases by unscrupulous landlords.  Furthe
allowed the government to confiscate land from any landlords who were deemed 
unscrupulous. Second, the Labor Relations Bill allowed for fair elections for trade unio
representation, which had heavily favored the Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GI
now known as the Guyana Agricultural Workers’ Union or (GAWU) over the Man 
Power Citizen Association (MPCA) as the principal union on the sugar estates.  The 
British also believed th
r, it 
n 
WU), 
at this bill was deliberately designed to provoke crisis, and was 
   
t for 
udget 
 
economic development of Guyana.  For example, they voted in the House of Commons to 
                         
responsible for turmoil such as a run on the banks and economic insecurity.35  The 
passing of this last piece of legislation was the impetus for the British to act, and they 
proceeded to suspend the Constitution and resume colonial rule over Guyana for the next 
four years, until 1957. 
   These colonial machinations were detrimental to Guyanese society because the 
sudden return of power to the British led to political, economic, and racial disturbances.
For example, to counteract support for the PPP, the UK government decided to “figh
the hearts and minds of the populace.”36  In order to accomplish this, numerous 
propaganda were employed via the media.  The Legislative Council increased its b
from $29,000 to $750,000 in order to increase press, radio broadcasts, and movies that 
delivered the state’s message.37  The circulation of the newspaper, the Bulletin, was 
increased from 10,000 to 30,000 and emphasized the development initiatives being 
pursued by the state in comparison to what the PPP had to offer.38  Additionally, 
following the suspension of the Constitution, the militarization in Guyana increased.  The
numbers of ordinary and commissioned ranks increased by nearly 50 and 100 percent 
respectively.  Jagan characterized this atmosphere as a “reign of terror under …a police 
state.” 39  Also, the British rule during 1953 to 1957 did not help to improve the 
                        
trol,” Guyana Review, 
ry 18, 2001).     
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 provide $44 million in development expenditure from 1954-1955.40  There were seve
talks about how the money would be spent.  It was purported to go towards road 
infrastructure, and a new seven-storey hospital.
ral 
 not 
ue to a 
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y did not 
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stitution, was detrimental to the internal workings of the PPP, ultimately 
 
 
                                                
41  However, development was clearly
a priority since these plans were never realized.42  Only $26 million was spent d
lack of preparation.43  The bulk of this money went towards finance, (credit corporatio
agriculture, drainage and irrigation, while some of the lowest amounts were spent on
health, social services and education.44  For these reasons, the econom
tially improve, and unemployment and the cost-of-living continued to rise.45
Meanwhile, the population was increasing substantially as between 1954 and 1955, 
soaring from 472,000 to 486,000.46      
These political and economic issues caused racial disturbances in Guyana, 
beginning with dissension within the PPP.  This party was in fact the “first nationalist 
movement in the country to pose a serious and consistent challenge and threat to Bri
imperial rule.”47  While its objectives may have been noble and placed the party in gre
stead with the rest of the country, the results of its policies, that is, the British suspensio
of the Con
leading to the dissolution of the relationship between the party’s two leaders, Cheddi 
Jagan and Forbes Burnham.  This in turn eventually led to the latter’s formation of the 
PNC.48   
 While initially, “…the split did not lead to racial politics, because most of the 
black radicals remained with Jagan while the moderate East Indians departed with 
Burnham,”49 the political scene soon thereafter became racially divided.  Rose believes
that Jagan was the first to introduce racial politics during a speech to the PPP congress in
 
40 Jagan, 192.   
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Statistics,Vol. 17. No. 11.  (New York: United Nations Statistical Division, 
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 1956, and precipitate the resignation of black radicals from the PPP, when he stated that 
the East Indian community (with a particular appeal to East Indian labourers, peasants
and youth) should support the PPP on the basis of ethnicity.
 
 
d that he was not responsible for introducing it, as racial divisions already 
xisted in Guyana due to the consequences of policies from its colonial past.  Perhaps in 
 on already existent racial 
 
50  Specifically, he used the 
Hindi slogan “Apan Jhaat,” which in English means ‘support your own race.’51  It could
be surmise
e
this vein, it would be more accurate to say that he capitalized
tensions. 
The PNC: Ideology, Policy and Consequences  
  
As a result of this political cleavage, the PNC was formed in 1957, when Forbes 
an 
orted 
rred 
alignm nd 
 
n the 
                                                
Burnham decided to leave the PPP and form his own party.  Two reasons are commonly 
attributed to his departure.   The first is that he decided to leave the party leadership that 
he shared with Cheddi Jagan on account of their markedly diverging ideologies.   
 Jagan’s views were in direct contrast to those of Burnham’s.  For instance, Jag
adamantly rejected the idea of a West Indies Federation.  Burnham, however, supp
this federation and believed it could be used to discontinue Guyana’s economic and 
political dependence on Britain.  Jagan believed that this dependent relationship was 
detrimental to Guyana’s successful economic development.  In fact, he prefe
ent with the socialist Bloc of Eastern Europe.  This position angered Britain a
the U.S., who were ideologically opposed to this union because it was dangerous to the 
Western interests in Guyana, especially in light of the ongoing Cold War.   
Burnham, on the other hand, has often been described as a Fabian socialist, 
meaning that he preferred gradual methods of social reforms and socialistic permeation of
existing political institutions rather than following the revolutionary theories of 
Marxism.52  According to Rose, he wanted a “neutral non-aligned approach”53 i
 
50 Rose, 170-171.     
51 Tony Jones, “Is Race an Enigma to Guyana’s Political System?” June 16, 2005, 
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52 “Fabian Society, ” The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 
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53 Rose, 169.  
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 arena of international politics.  Therefore, he was opposed to Jagan’s anti-American a
anti-British position.  He thought that the solutions to Guyana’s problems needed to be 
locally derived and could not be found in the ideals of international communist 
alliances.
nd 
His goal was therefore Guyanese nationalism.  As a result, he supported 
est 
 
 into his political ambitions, preferring his seemingly 
less rad
 
ham 
e.  
nd 
y, 
y.  
 of 
Guyana.  He believed that “…a just society cannot be achieved unless the majority of the 
                                                
54  
Britain’s proposal for Guyanese independence within the general framework of a W
Indian federation and an electoral system based on proportional representation for 
Guyana. 55  
 The second viewpoint on the Burnham-Jagan split, and the dominant one, 
suggests that the reason for Burnham’s departure from the PPP was that the Americans
and British moved quickly to tap
ical version of socialism to Jagan’s.  They proceeded to engineer his gaining the 
reigns of power in the country while at the same time ensuring that Jagan and the PPP 
was removed from the scene.56  
 While Burnham was the choice of the imperial powers, he ended up instituting a 
system of authoritarian rule for 30 years.  Namely, he set about implementing policies 
that not only alienated his former colonial supporters but also greatly undermined
Guyana’s economic and political developments.  The PNC’s policy agenda was designed 
to transform Guyana in to a “cooperative socialist” society.  As a matter of fact, Burn
was credited with making Guyana the first cooperative republic in the world, an 
experiment inaugurated on February 23, 1970.57  This brand of socialism was designed to 
alleviate the problems inherent in the economy, but in fact, only made them wors
Cooperativism was defined in the PNC’s mandate as an idea with both organizational a
psychological forms, which was rooted in the psyche of Guyana’s people.58  Specificall
Burnham asserted that socialism did not fall into European and North American 
definitions, but was defined specifically by the social needs and wants of the countr
 These needs and wants were directed at creating a just society for the people
 
54 Rose, 169.  
55 Rose, 169.   
56 Rose, 169.   
57 Fitzroy Ambursely and Robin Cohen, eds., Crisis in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1983), 29.   
58 Quoted in Rose, 179. 
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 people, namely the masses or the little men, have a full share in the ownership and 
control of the economy, a share which corresponds realistically with their political 
power.”59  Here we see an ironic move in that Burnham chose to distance his policies 
from th e a 
 
rian 
se initiatives and their impact on the Guyanese economy, this 
na 
r 
 
 of 
 
ic 
 
 
                           
at of the colonial powers, yet in enacting his doctrine, acted very much lik
colonial master over the Guyanese people.   
According to Rose, cooperative socialism had two objectives:  to rid the 
Guyanese society of the “exploitative and dependency features of the capitalist world 
order and to strengthen Burnham’s hold on power.”60  Additionally, there were nine 
initiatives associated with cooperative socialism.  These initiatives exacerbated rather
than helped to achieve the above two objectives.  They combined to form an authorita
environment that further plunged Guyana into a downward economic spiral.  Before 
examining some of the
paper will first discuss the political and economic foundations that paved the way for co-
operative socialism.    
 Brackette Williams, in his work Stains on My Name, War in my Veins:  Guya
and the Politics of Cultural Struggle states that Guyana’s transition to socialism unde
Burnham was not enacted entirely in the interest of the people but rather in the self-
interest of the elite.  This is evidenced by the fact that following independence, PNC
leaders changed their pro-business, pro-imperialist positions they had adopted during 
their coalition with the United Force (UF) in order to prevent the Marxist PPP from 
taking power.61  What this demonstrates, he argues, was that in reality, the main focus
the party was in winning state power and not in advancing the real interest and welfare of
the Guyanese people.  Furthermore, he believes that the PNC had no direct econom
interest in the dominant industries—sugar and bauxite.  Support for this assertion lies in
the fact that both these industries were foreign owned at the time.  Therefore, the 
institutional base for their power would lay in the control of state apparatus and thus, a 
centralization of power.  The PNC therefore believed that through increasing their control
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ercent of Guyana’s population was unemployed, and 35 percent of these 
were un  
 
state, party leaders would accumulate increasing influence and power.62  This in 
part led to the decreasing profitability of the sugar and bauxite industries and ultimately, 
an open invitation for IMF and WB structural adjustment policies.   
Additionally, there was a previously existing militant population in Guyan
to the permeation of the PPP’s past Marxist-Leninist policies.  This played a major ro
the successful ushering in of a cooperative socialist republic.  Specifically, the PPP and 
its Marxist-Leninist doctrines had helped to 
ist Clive Thomas states that Burnham adopted this similar socialist policy—
cooperativism—in order to capitalize on the attitudes of the masses, which had
successfully indoctrinated under the PPP.63 
There were also several economic factors that played a role in the lead-up to the 
creation of a Cooperative Socialist Republic in 1970 and they all relate to the 
underdeveloped and dependent nature of the Guyanese economy.  As previously 
mentioned, the country’s most productive assets, such as bauxite and sugar, were own
and operated by foreign multinational corporations, and relatedly, its economy was very 
dependent on foreign corporate investment, foreign technology and external trade, 
especially from the U.S. and Britain.  Further, Guyana’s economy strongly relied on 
imported goods including foodstuffs.  Ironically, the country was spending large sums of 
its foreign currency on food imports despite being an agriculturally based economy. 
Guyana was also extremely dependent on imported oil, fertilizers and capital equipmen
to develop its economy.  Exacerbating these economic problems (and linked to them
the fact that Guyana was unable to provide ample jobs for its small workforce.  For 
instance, 69 p
deremployed due to the seasonal nature of the agricultural sector.64  Hence,
policies introduced under the auspices of cooperative socialism were designed to counter 
these trends. 
Two of the initiatives introduced under cooperative socialism involved the 
expansion of state property through import substitution industrialization (ISI), a main part
                                                 
62 Brackette Williams, Stains on my Name, War in my Veins: Guyana and the Politics of Cultural Struggle  
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1991), 36.   
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Monthly Review Foundation, 1988), 252.   
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 of which was a program of nationalization.  This led to the creation of domest
industries, which produced goods that were once imported, thus separating state-owned 
resources from international corporate structures.  For instance, Burnham created an agri
business industry by merging the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.  The aim
use local agricultural products as raw materials, thereby increasing domestic 
manufacturing. This would, in turn, reduce Guyana’s traditional dependence on foreign 
exchange to finance imports.  At the same time, this strategy would increa
ic 
-
 was to 
se production 
of local
te 
e 
d 
Guyan  
l 
the economic status of Afro-
Guyane al 
1970’s.  For instance, during this period, the bauxite and sugar industries reaped sizable 
                           
 food and other agricultural products within Guyana.  While seemingly a 
profitable move, it failed because the agricultural sector was extremely disorganized.  
Additionally, those in the agricultural sector were poorly trained and unable to execu
the best agricultural methods in order to produce the intended results.65   
Contributing to the failure of the ISI strategy was the fact that branch plants wer
set up by foreign corporations.  These plants assembled only semi-finished products an
employed highly capital-intensive technology and thus did not contribute to solving 
a’s employment problems.  Nor did they contribute to expanding investments in
the country.  While profits were high in this industry, they were mostly returned to the 
home countries of these multinational corporations.  This led to a substantial externa
drain of foreign exchange and thus a shortage of foreign currency in the host state.66       
Also under this initiative, the bauxite and sugar industries were nationalized.  
According to Rose, acquiring the “assets of the bauxite industry was perhaps the single 
most decisive event that determined Guyana’s future economic policy and the PNC 
socialist strategy.”67  This was because it greatly improved 
se, middle-class PNC supporters who became the members of the new manageri
staff in the bauxite industry.  If not for these new jobs, it is unlikely that the program of 
cooperative socialism would have received such support.  In that case, it would not have 
been as easy as it was for Burnham to usher in socialism.   
The PNC’s nationalization of foreign assets was a success until around the mid-
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 profits.68  This was largely due to a substantial rise in the price of world sugar,69 and less 
likely to PNC efforts.  The stellar performance of these two industries led to a period
economic prosperity in Guyana, but these economic surpluses were misused by the PNC.  
They used the money to provide patronage benefits to the bureaucratic middle class, 
to expand the military and surveillance branches in order to hold on to power.  As a 
result, the agriculture industry as well as the natural resource sector, suffered immensely
The abuse and misuse of sta
 of 
and 
.  
te resources was so dramatic that by 1980, Guyana was 
incapab n.70  
fore 
o deterioration in the quality of social 
service ly, 
s its own operations.”74  The 
debt pr
le of meeting the food, health, education, and welfare needs of the populatio
This was not much different from the downturns that took place in the economy be
the PNC assumed power.   
 Another reason for the lack of funding to important industries was because 
production and profitability in the three dominant sectors, sugar, rice and bauxite 
industries plummeted.  Export levels declined sharply and so did foreign currency 
earnings.  Consequently, the external debt escalated71 as did the cost of servicing it.   
Overall, from the period of 1966 to the late 1980’s, Guyana’s economy experienced 
decreasing output, large deficits, high inflation, and as a result, a substantial build up of 
external debt arrears.72  Relatedly, there was als
s, and in several public utilities services such as electricity, fresh water supp
public transport, telephone, postal services and sanitation.  These deficiencies inevitably 
led to serious health risks for the population.73  
 It has been suggested that one reason for the failures of nationalization to 
increase profit and levels of production was the fact that the government was responsible 
for supporting these “loss-making public entities as well a
oblems caused in part by nationalization negatively affected Guyana’s relations 
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 with the international community, making it ineligible to receive aid from donors such
the Caribbean Development Bank, the UK and the US.75 
A second reason that nationalization proved an unsuccessful strategy was due to
the price control mechanisms at the time.  While the PNC tried
 as 
 
 to control production and 
profits,
prices o
ents 
mercial 
d rescheduling 
of arrea
ark 
                           
 they failed in this enterprise because as noted earlier, the international market 
determined the prices of the country’s products. Therefore, the PNC’s attempt at control 
was unsuccessful, because due to the nature of the international market, they could not 
determine the costs of production in the state-run enterprises. 
The poor economic state of affairs that resulted from nationalization forced the 
government to cut back on capital expenditures.  This led to job layoffs and increases of 
f goods as subsidies for food items were removed.  There was also a reduction in 
imported goods resulting in shortages of much needed materials such as spare parts and 
especially intermediate goods needed for production and maintenance of public 
utilities.76  All of this ultimately led to a fall in real wages and a devaluation of the 
Guyanese dollar. 
To assist with the economic imbalances, Guyana sought rescheduling agreem
with banks.  For instance, in 1979, Guyana also sought such agreements with com
banks such as the Royal Bank of Canada.  This is an important reason why Guyana 
remained in significant debt up to 10 years later.  Specifically, the “repeate
rs and interest refinancing contributed to an increase in the country’s external 
debt”.77  The Guyanese government experienced extreme difficulty in meeting the 
payments without “significant recourse to…higher taxes and cuts in productive 
expenditures in economic infrastructure, health and education.”78  This, in addition to the 
failures of cooperative socialism, steeped the country further into debt.     
Another of Burnham’s initiatives, introduced as part of his cooperative socialism, 
was the concept of the ‘paramountcy of the party,’ which was unveiled in 1974 to m
the PNC’s 10th anniversary.  This doctrine meant that the PNC would maintain 
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 supremacy over all other political parties, and the state as a whole.79  This was a Marxist-
Leninist doctrine in that it “recognized the vanguard party as the leading force in 
society.”80  This monolithic, hegemonic role was similar to that of socialist parties in the 
former USSR and Eastern Europe.  In fact, this doctrine allowed the party to have 
“…practical and theoretical leadership at all levels—political, economic, social and
cultural.”
 
 
e national anthem, 
the dail  and 
 legally and directly transferred to the 
PNC.  T
o this 
g the 
rbated   
1976, Guyana’s armed forces increased from 2,135 to 
22,000.
am 
                                                
81  Evidence of the party’s strategy to ensure its dominance were the singing of
the party solidarity song at public functions immediately following th
y raising of the national and PNC flags in places such as the National Service
Youth Corps camps, and indoctrination sessions promoting the party line at various 
educational institutions.82  Also as will be seen below, the party ensured its views 
prevailed by censoring opposition media or denying them newsprint.  Not surprisingly, 
this reification of the party meant that corruption became endemic.   
One of the many privileges granted to the ‘paramount’ party was that it was 
financed by public funds.  State resources could be
hese resources were used as “patronage to mobilize support for the party 
executive.”83  For example, between 1975 and 1980, G$54.3 million was allocated t
new department of state (PNC), yet only G$1.4 million was accounted for by the 
regime.84  This led to a dearth of availability of public funds in other areas, includin
industries vital to the nation’s economic survival.  
Other initiatives introduced under Burnham’s cooperative socialism exace
racial tensions and increased repression for certain groups and sectors.   One of the 
policies implemented was an expansion of the military and paramilitary forces in 
Guyana.  Between 1964 and 
85  Several violent incidents, such as a secessionist outbreak by a group of 
Amerindians, and other issues on the border of Guyana and Venezuela served as 
justification for this increase.  However, the underlying rationale was to give Burnh
 
79 Ambursely and Cohen, 32.   
80 Rose, 194.   
81 Rose, 194. 
82 Rose, 197.   
83 Rose, 195.   
84 Rose, 195.   
85 Allahar, 108.   
 19
 more control over the citizenry and to make it more difficult for opposition parties to 
challenge the government.   
While the increase in the military undoubtedly provided employment for many,
thus improving the welfare of the population, it also was accompanied by “aggressive 
efforts to make the members act and think in partisan manner in favor of the PNC 
party.”
 
 
s 
rence 
an.88  
 
 
ia 
ere 
Guyanese.  Other methods used to deter the Indo-Guyanese were racial insults and 
discrimination during training.90  In addition, while the religious needs of the Afro-
Guyanese were met (the majority are Christians), those of the Indo-Guyanese (who were 
                           
86  In addition, the policies carried with them definite racial undertones as they 
privileged Afro-Guyanese to the detriment of Indo-Guyanese. 
 According to former PPP General Secretary Donald Ramotar, during colonial 
times, the Afro-Guyanese were primarily recruited for the Disciplined Forces in order to
ensure that the Indo-Guyanese sugar workers remained on the plantations even after the 
end of indentureship.  He argued that the PNC policy was a deliberate continuation of thi
strategy. 87  Evidentially, upon acceding to power, Burnham fired then Indo-Guyanese 
Major of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF), Raymond Sattaur, and appointed Cla
Price, an Afro-Guyanese.  Unlike Sattaur, Price was not a professional military m
Furthermore, in order to ensure the Indo-Guyanese were not accepted into the services if
they attempted to join, a rigid anti-Indian testing mechanism was initiated.89  According
to the International Commission of Jurists’ 1965 report, a standard of physical criter
such as height and chest measurement was established.  This excluded the Indo-
Guyanese, who as a race, were smaller in stature than the Africans.                     
 Additionally, recruits were required to be unmarried.  The Indo-Guyanese w
thwarted by this requirement because they customarily married earlier than the Afro-
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 primarily Hindus and Muslims) were not.  For example, there was a prevalence of 
Christian practices and a lack of Hindu or Muslim practices, thus further alienating the 
Indo-G  Indo-
e 
 
e actions illustrate that the PNC was 
directly
e 
ters 
d the WPA.97  Walter Rodney, leader of the WPA, 
conduc  
                                                
uyanese from joining the forces.91  This racism continues even today, as the
Guyanese account for no more than 5 percent of the officer corps and enlisted ranks.92   
Another component of the PNC’s autocratic rule was its domination of the 
judiciary, a process facilitated by the passage of legislation that “preempted the use of the 
courts to mount legal and constitutional challenges against the actions of the PNC 
government and its decisions.”93  To reinforce the party’s power, the PNC flag was flown 
over the Court of Appeals.94  The judiciary then officially became part of the “coerciv
apparatus of the state to intimidate and punish political opponents arrested on trumped-up
charges by the PNC regime.”95  These repressiv
 violating human rights.  Furthermore, due to the paramountcy of the party, these 
actions could be performed with impunity.       
As a consequence of PNC policies, not only was the nation’s economy in declin
but racial tensions were exacerbated, political cleavages deepened, and repression 
increased.  For example, prior to the 1964 elections, PNC supporters went out into the 
streets chanting slogans, throwing dust in the faces of Indians and surrounding houses 
telling people to vote PNC or else they would come for their wives and daughters.96   
 Disenchantment with the PNC led many Afro-Guyanese who had been suppor
of the party to join the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), a Marxist party founded by 
the charismatic Afro-Guyanese intellectual Walter Rodney.  (Former PPP supporters 
seeking an alternative also joined the WPA).  In fact, by 1979, it is speculated that three 
quarters of the population supporte
ted a scathing campaign against the PNC regime.  This included industrial strikes,
and other forms of social unrest.   
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 In response, Burnham increased the use of the armed forces to maintain political 
stability.  He feared that the WPA would seriously challenge the PNC’s dominance, 
given the party’s rising popularity and the fact that Rodney was Afro-Guyanese.  
Therefore, in an effort to disengage citizens from the WPA’s ideologies, Burnham de
newsprint to the Day Clean, a
nied 
 biweekly newspaper published by the WPA.98  Finally, in 
June 19
 also censored Guyana’s daily newspaper, the Chronicle, 
and bot
d, 
 
om Burnham’s cooperative socialism, it is clear that the policy was a failure as far as 
oncerned.  Its merits lay more in theory than in deeds.   This made the PNC 
and Burnham seem duplicitous in their efforts to actually help the Guyanese people.    
80, in an effort to eliminate all threats, Burnham had Rodney assassinated by a 
bomb blast.99  Rodney’s assassination was certainly one of the factors that led to the 
weakening of the WPA.       
Censoring the Day Clean was part of an overall strategy to control all opposition 
mass media.  For example, he
h national radio stations.  Additionally, newsprint was also denied to the weekly 
newspaper, the Mirror, which was operated by the PPP, as well as the Catholic Standar
a Roman Catholic paper.100   
Given the economic chaos and the political and social instability, which resulted
fr
Guyana was c
 
Conclusion 
  
 The actions of the British were instrumental in creating an indelible imprint on 
Guyanese society.  They used divisive methods to create dissension between the East 
Indians and Africans, the two dominant racial groups in the country.   In spite of th
efforts, however, members of both these groups were able to form a political party, the 
PPP, as a result of the mobilization by the trade union movement and by the appeal of th
party’s socialist ideology.   The Party’s goal was to fight for independence and to 
advance the cause of the nation’s poor.  This was a tangible assertion to the colonialis
that the Guyanese people were capable of self-government.  However, machinations by 
the British would emerge once again, this time with the help of the Americans, in 
ese 
e 
ts 
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 reasserting colonial control of the country.  While plunging the economy into further 
financial disarray, the British and Americans also engaged in divide and rule policies that 
hearken
 
d to 
mic and 
e 
 
ue to the coercions of the IMF and World Bank, as well as Guyana’s dire economic 
tuation at that particular point in time.  The particulars of Guyana’s involvement with 
ese two organizations will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapter.     
 
 
ed back to colonial times in order to create dissension within the PPP.  Their 
actions led to the creation of a competing political party (to the PPP), the PNC under the
leadership of Forbes Burnham.    
Theoretically, Burnham’s unique cooperative socialism policies were designe
lift Guyana out of its economic mire, yet the hidden power-seeking agenda of the PNC, 
and the party’s weak control of the economy only led to an exacerbation of econo
racial tensions in an already unstable country.   His policies, in conjunction with the 
earlier colonial actions weakened the economy to the extent that the stage was set for th
eventual intervention by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.   
Additionally, the fact that Burnham agreed to the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs demonstrates a deviation from his socialist policies.  This deviation occurred
d
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th
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23
  
 
CHAPTER THREE—STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN GUYANA 
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Introduction 
 
 While Guyana’s paradoxical fate as one of the world’s most impoverished 
countries despite its riches is rooted in colonial occurrences, this analysis examines its 
strong links to the negative effects of structural adjustment policies that the government
notwithstanding their adherence to socialism, have been forced to implement as a resu
of its balance of payment problems.  As was shown in the previous chapter, these debt 
problems had their beginnings with Guyana’s economic status as an underdevelop
state, which was entrenched at the time of colonialism when the country was brought into
the system of global capitalism as a producer of raw materials.  Its condition was 
exacerbated by political developments in the nation that included British intervention
subvert the democratic process in the nation as well as the authoritarian policies of the 
PNC government, and racial tensions in the society.                                          
 While the preceding chapter set the historical context, the objective of this cha
is to discuss the policy prescriptions, specifically the structural adjustment measure
developed by International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented for over a decade to address 
Guyana’s economic woes. Specifically, the focus will be on the Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP), the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), and the Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative,101 which had an accompanying component called the Poverty Reduct
Strategy (PRS).  What will become evident is that while SAPs were initially designed to
im e Guyana’s economic efficiency and productivity, they achieved only modest 
success and have even exacerbated its economic problems in some cases.                      
 An overview of each of these programs will be given.  Next, the general im
of these prescriptions on Guyana’s economy and society as well as on three particular
sectors of the economy, notably the logging, mining and sugar industries will be 
 
101 Hereafter, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative will be referred to as the Enhanced HIPC.   
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 analyzed.  These three industries are the s for several reasons.  They are three of 
Guyana’s most lucrative and important industries, due to the abundance of forests, gold, 
precious metals, and sugar in Guyana.                                                                  
 After examining the negative impact of SAPS on these three industries, which to 
some measure impacted Guyana’s economy and society, this analysis w th
 focu
ill en present 
some of the reforms that may possibly address the shortcomings caused by the structural 
The Ph
here 
5 and 
-
 idea is 
 to 
l level.  In other words, trade barriers 
globall  
                                                
adjustment measures, thereby minimizing the devastation in Guyana.    
ilosophy Governing Structural Adjustment Measures: Neoliberalism 
   
The principles governing the IMF’s policies are rooted in the free market,102 or 
what is commonly referred to currently as neoliberalism.  Although there is much debate 
as to whether this idea is new or just classical liberalism in new guise, the objective 
will not be to debate the terminology, merely to utilize it for explanatory purposes.  The 
term is often a prefix for another, globalization,103 and the two are sometimes used 
interchangeably.104  It is a development strategy that began to emerge in the 1960s10
which combines the ideas of classical liberalism with those of the free market, or laissez
faire economics.  Essentially, the underlying philosophy is that the market must be 
allowed to operate without obstruction. Following the logic of Adam Smith, the
that the market is the best means of efficient resource allocation; hence this will lead
increased productivity, growth and development.  In the current era marked by 
globalization, this means that not only must internal obstacles to the free market be 
removed, but the same must occur at the globa
y must be torn down.  This is witnessed in the many free trade agreements that
have been negotiated or are under discussion. 
In terms of the internal organization of economies, the logic of neoliberalism 
dictates that privatization, or private ownership of the means of production be 
 
102 This ‘market’ is the “mode of exchange in which the needs of society are met through the buying and 
selling of goods and services in the form of private property,” Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline 
of Social Reform (Toronto: Garamond Press and Humanities Press, 1995), 79. 
103 Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004), 13.   
104 This paper refers primarily to the phenomenon of economic globalization, which is largely driven by 
neoliberalism.   
105 John Rapley, “Development Theory in the Wake of Structural Adjustment,” in Understanding 
Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 58.   
 25
 emphasized and relatedly, there must be limited government intervention in the economy
The logic behind this, in order for the market to operate freely, and to ensure growth, 
state intervention in the economy must be kept at a minimum, because too much  “state 
intervention had distorted prices in such a way as to discourage production of potentially 
lucrative primary goods, thereby slowing growth.”
.  
106  In other words, the invisible hand 
of Adam Smith’s analysis is what will regulate the market and bring about 
equilibrium.107  The operation of the invisible hand, however, does not eliminate the ne
for government regulation.  According to Milton Friedman, “government is essential b
as a forum for determining the ‘rules of the game’ and as an umpire to interpret and 
enforce the rules decided on.”
ed 
oth 
08  Therefore, while the free market has lessened the range 
of issues that require political decisions, political force is still required in the free market 
al Adjustment in Guyana
1
to “enforce substantial conformity.”109    
Implementation and Effects of Structur  
IMF an
ld 
As 
ny 
of one superpower (the U.S.), the victory of capitalism over communism, and the rise of 
                         
 
d World Bank SAPs in Guyana 
 
Guyana’s economic problems as we have seen stem both from its colonial past 
and from the policies enacted by the country’s political leaders.  SAPs were adopted 
because of the debt crisis, the lack of political alternatives given the demise of the Co
War, combined with the ensuing victory of capitalism over communism, and lack of 
political alternatives.  Just prior to the implementation of SAPs, the economy was in 
crisis, with a combined domestic and foreign debt worth 413 percent of the GDP.110  
While severe, this scenario is consistent with that in other underdeveloped countries.  
a consequence of this type of economic crisis, poverty, diseases, low levels of education, 
and lack of access to social services such as health care became prevalent, creating a 
vicious cycle.  In addition to the debt crisis, the end of the Cold War meant the hegemo
                        
, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 15.   
106 Rapley, 60.   
107 See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1937). 
108 Milton Friedman
109 Friedman, 15.   
110 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 20.   
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 neoliberalism.111  This in turn meant “choices available to political leaders on the left 
[were] severely constrained.”112  Not surprisingly, as a result, the socialist mandate was 
d 
components to reorganize the economy in order to restore 
acroe
 
d, 
nt in 
l 
e IFIs, 
.  
Therefo
 spending 
by cutting its expenditures on goods, services and maintenance programs.116   
                                                
abandoned, and a neoliberal one adopted.   
 Faced with such debilitating economic problems, Guyana, like many of its 
counterparts in the developing world, were forced to abide by the dictates of the IFIs, 
such as the IMF and World Bank, to avoid economic collapse.  The World Bank, for 
instance, granted loans to governments facing balance-of-payments difficulties, provide
the national governments agreed to implement structural adjustment policies or SAPs, 
which contain clearly-defined 
m conomic stability.113   
 Guyana began negotiations on SAPs in 1985, but the more stringent SAP 
measures were not adopted until negotiations occurred in 1989.  Desmond Hoyte of the 
People’s National Congress (PNC) assumed power as President of Guyana in 1985 (after
the death of Forbes Burnham).  With the country facing a staggering amount of external 
debt, he entered into negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank.  This move woul
however, considerably alter Guyana’s state structure.  As mentioned in Chapter two, 
Guyana was a socialist state, and therefore there were high levels of state involveme
the economy.  Extensive nationalization of industries, and significant public sector 
spending in health, education and employment existed in Guyana at that time.  Neolibera
policies, however, which were the foundations of the restructuring packages of th
advocate lessening the role of the state in order to achieve economic efficiency
re, the reduction of government spending is crucial to this initiative.   
The reduction in government spending began in 1985 (as part of debt 
restructuring) because the Guyanese government witnessed unacceptable primary deficits 
averaging about 12 percent of GDP.114  This was likely because expenditures represented 
95 percent of GDP during the 1980’s.115  The government therefore reduced its
 
111 Deonandan, “Guyana’s PPP,” 108-109. 
112 Deonandan, “Guyana’s PPP,” 109.   
113 Rapley, 83.   
114 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 17.   
115 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 25.   
116 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 27.   
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 Guyana continued SAP negotiations when, in 1989, Desmond Hoyte (PNC) 
enacted the ERP in conjunction with the World Bank and the IMF.  As part of its plan to 
repay outstanding debt, the Hoyte government implemented “appropriate macroeconomic 
and structural reform policies under the ERP supported by new loans from the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)…”117  In essence the 
program entailed massive cutbacks in government spending in the economy and it also 
involved efforts to attract foreign private investments in targeted sectors of the economy..  
These policies were continued under the PPP when it gained power in 1992.118             
 The ERP also contained provisions for privatizing various public corporations.119  
This is one of the central tenets of neoliberal policies.  The objective of this initiative is to 
raise money for cash-starved governments by selling national enterprises to private 
entities, and also to ensure that less of the government’s money is spent in the public 
sector.120  In addition, it is believed that private firms are better at maintaining and 
increasing efficiency and profitability than the public sector.121                                   
 Further justifications for privatization in Guyana’s economy must also be noted.  
As mentioned in chapter two, nationalization was considered to be one of the causes of 
Guyana’s debt.  This is evidenced by the fact that the public sector wage bill was 15 
percent of GDP during the 1980’s.  This was higher than any country in the Caribbean at 
the time122 and occurred as a result of Guyana’s nationalization program, which began in 
1972.  Aggravating this problem was the fact that market conditions for Guyana’s exports 
declined in the early 1980’s.123 As a result of SAPs, by 2000, over 80 percent of the 
government’s total net asset holdings from 1988 had been privatized or liquidated.124   
                                                 
117 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 91.   
118 At first glance, this may seem surprising since, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the PPP was a 
Marxist party.  It is suggested that the reason for this is that the PPP was constrained by the previous ERP 
agreement enacted under Hoyte and Burnham’s PNC.  In an economic sense, they were indeed constrained 
due to the need to repay the country’s outstanding debt.   
119 “Structural Adjustment and Agriculture in Guyana: From Crisis to Recovery. III.  Economic Program, 
1988, and Recovery,” International Labor Organization, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/agrguyan/143e3.htm#h2 (Accessed June 20, 
2007).   
120 Rapley, 83.   
121 Rapley, 84.   
122 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 25.   
123 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 27.   
124 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 29.   
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  To ensure the efficiency of the growing private sector, deregulation of the 
economy was required.  This measure is defined as removing the “constraints and rules, 
backed by sanctions, which are intended to modify the activities of corporation in the 
private sector.”125  It also includes trade liberalization and the abolition of marketing 
boards, which help to reduce trade hindrances.  One such regulation is the industry-
specific one that places constraints on prices, production, profits, and standards of 
service. This helps to reduce price distortions.  Trade liberalization also operates in the 
general interest of capital.126  According to the doctrine of neoliberalism, this policy is 
beneficial because it benefits the developing country by opening it to trade.127  In 
Guyana, the trade liberalization strategy was adopted under the ERP in 1989.128  Its goals 
were to lower protection, reduce the dispersion of tariffs, and replace non-tariff barriers 
with tariffs.129   
 One final method implemented by the IMF and the World Bank to achieve lower 
interest rates was the devaluing of the Guyanese dollar.  This act was purported to reduce 
producer prices and therefore increase exports,130 consequently bringing more money 
into the economy.  Specifically, through the process of devaluation, the prices exporters 
pay become cheaper, making them more likely to purchase.   In Guyana, the larg
devaluation took place in February 1991, when the Guyanese dollar went from G$45.00 
to G$101.75 per US$1.
est 
                                                
131   
The ERP was limited in its success132 as Guyana still found itself heavily 
indebted.  In response to this situation, the IMF and World Bank then created the HIPC 
initiative in 1996 (under the rule of the PPP).  This was part of a larger objective for all 
indebted poor countries and its goals were to reduce the external debt burden of all 
eligible poor countries to sustainable thresholds, as determined by the international 
community, in a short time period.133  According to Stiglitz, however, one of the 
 
125 Teeple, 86.   
126 Teeple, 86.   
127 Rapley, 88.   
128 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 104.   
129 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 104.   
130 Rapley, 92.   
131 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 42.    
132 The ERP was also highly unsuccessful in other countries, proving that the program itself was faulty and 
its failures cannot be attributed to the countries themselves.   
133 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 91.   
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 drawbacks of the HIPC was the fact that the IMF had major control over the 
recommendations. The developing countries themselves were not given much choice or 
input into the program.134  This criticism the IMF later tried to address in subsequent debt 
restructuring programs as discussed below.   
In light of the limited successes of the original HIPC, introduced in 1996, 
Guyana’s Enhanced HIPC was introduced in 1999.  The Enhanced HIPC was to provide 
even faster and greater delivery of HIPC assistance to those HIPC countries that were 
doing a good job of implementing reform policies.135  As part of the Enhanced HIPC 
requirement, countries currently receiving assistance under this initiative must develop a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with the participation of civil society.136  Its 
aim was to provide a long-term focus to specifically address the multidimensional issues 
of poverty,137 which existed prior to the implementation of, and were in part, exacerbated 
by prior structural adjustment programs such as the ERP and HIPC.  Additionally, the 
Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP) was developed and was designed to facilitate 
the goals of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).138   
Unlike the HIPC, one of the core elements central to the PRS was that the 
composition of the PRS paper, called the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), must 
be country-driven.  This represents a shift within the IMF’s rhetoric and policy139 as they 
seek to confront legitimacy issues that arose in the structure of the original HIPC.  By 
promoting a ‘national ownership’ of the policies, the IMF was taking a step to ensure that 
the developing country was more likely to perceive the program as legitimate and will as 
a result have more political will to implement it, thus increasing its chances of success.140   
Also as part of the IMF reform of its restructuring programs, specifically the PRS, 
was the requirement that the country seeking aid must include a greater sector of society, 
specifically civil society organizations (along with government and businesses) in the 
                                                 
134 Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2002), 226.   
135 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 93.   
136 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 93.   
137 Halifax Initiative, “Issue Brief—Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—September 2005,” 
http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/index.php/Factsheets/800 (Accessed April 1, 2007). 
138 “Overview,” Guyana Information and News Agency (GINA), 
http://gina.gov.gy/prsp_psip/PSIP%20REPORT%202005.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2007).    
139 Jacqueline Best, “Legitimacy Dilemmas: The IMF’s Pursuit of Country Ownership,” Third World 
Quarterly 28. no. 3 (2007): 476. 
140 Best, 479. 
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 decision making process regarding the PRSP.141  In the PRSP, each country must show 
how “money freed up from debt servicing will be used to alleviate poverty.”142  This 
paper must outline the country’s proposed macroeconomic, structural and social policies 
and programs that will promote growth and reduce poverty.  It must also outline in great 
detail any external financing needs and major sources of financing.  The paper is then 
reviewed and eventually approved by the World Bank and IMF Board of Directors.143  
According to the Halifax Initiative Brief on PRSP’s, this is a necessary step towards 
receiving debt reduction.  It is also a valuable step towards achieving debt relief, as the 
country itself is more likely to be able to propose appropriate recommendations than 
would and IFI such as the World Bank or IMF.  In Guyana, civil society task forces held 
over 100 meetings as part of the drafting of the PRSP,144 and a total of 8,400 Guyanese 
people participated in the consultations.    
Guyana’s PRSP focused on “maintaining macroeconomic stability through 
sustainable fiscal and wage policies, prudent monetary policy, and flexible exchange rate 
policy. [It] also envisaged structural reforms to improve the efficiency of the public 
service, increase the productivity of government investment, restructure key productive 
sectors, and increase competitiveness.”145  There were also social safety net programs 
and other poverty-reducing programs.146   
                                                
 In the area of fiscal policy, the focus was to provide cost-efficient delivery of 
public services to the population, maintaining and upgrading physical infrastructures, and 
financing productivity-enhancing public investment.  Such government subsidies and 
safety net programs were designed to target the poorest based on certain criteria.147  
Value Added Tax (VAT) was also implemented to help generate more revenues.  
Specifically, VAT is a levy added to the ‘value’ of goods and services as they pass 
through each stage of the production process.  It is arguably less damaging to the 
 
141 The Carter Center, “Report of the Third Development Cooperation Forum: Human Security and the 
Future of Development Cooperation,” Atlanta, Georgia: The Carter Center, February 2002, 
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1186.pdf. (Accessed April 1, 2007), 101. 
142 Halifax Initiative. “Issue Brief—Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—September 2005.”  
143 Halifax Initiative, “Issue Brief—Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—September 2005.” 
144 “Development Cooperation Forum:  Human Security and the Future of Development Cooperation, 81.  
145 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 135.   
146 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 135.  
147 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 136.   
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 economy than income taxes due to its focus on consumption.  This makes it less likely 
that the money levied will be used for income redistribution, which can be damaging.148  
The PRS Exchange Rate policy strategy required that Guyana maintain a flexible 
exchange rate in order to absorb exogenous shocks that result from commodity price 
swings, cost increases and natural events. Such shocks have in part caused deterioration 
in the terms of trade.149 
In order to ensure public sector efficiency and governance, a wage policy was 
implemented.  This policy focused on assigning different wages based on individual 
merit to attract qualified staff likely to maintain longevity in their positions.  There was 
also a pension reform, which would ensure the long-term solvency of Guyana’s National 
Insurance Scheme (NIS).  It called for hiring, in particular, more skilled personnel at the 
middle-level management, which was at the time seriously depleted.150 
 The PRS was also aimed at assisting the Amerindian communities, who in 
Guyana, are among the most impoverished.  In fact, the majority falls below the poverty 
line.  The PRS envisaged specific projects intended to improve their quality of life, as 
well as that of poor Guyanese people in general, thereby bringing them out of poverty.  
These projects included providing primary health care, supplying potable electricity and 
water, providing transportation, and building nurseries and elementary schools with 
scholastic materials and tools.  Also under this plan was the upgrading and maintenance 
of economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges and sea defenses to improve the 
livelihood of Guyanese coast-dwellers.  The PRS also aimed to expand land distribution 
and accelerate lease-to-own operations.  Training programs for displaced workers and 
social safety nets such as targeted electricity and water subsides for vulnerable members 
of society, which comprise the elderly and disabled, are also envisaged under the PRS.  
Children from poor families would also receive subsidized education and health care.151 
The success of these initiatives is discussed in the following section.   
There are however, several challenges to successful implementation of the PRS 
such as natural disasters like droughts and floods, which have had adverse effects on 
                                                 
148 Daniel Mitchell, “Beware the Value-Added Tax,” The Heritage Foundation, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/bg1852.cfm (Accessed July 31, 2007). 
149 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 137.   
150 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 137.  
151 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 141.   
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 agriculture. Other challenges that need to be overcome are the maintenance of a peaceful 
political environment and increasing security levels.152  Additionally, Guyana needs to 
avoid somehow the emigration of skilled workers.  This is sometimes referred to as a 
‘brain drain’ wherein the home country needs the skills of the professionals who emigrate 
to avoid the symptoms of underdevelopment.153  The loss of experienced professionals in 
Guyana has had adverse effects on productivity, and is preventing the accumulation of 
practical knowledge by younger, inexperienced workers.154  
 
General Effects on Guyanese Economy and Society     
 
 The previously discussed structural adjustment programs have had varying effects 
on the Guyanese economy and society.  While successful in the short run, the reduction 
in government spending failed because it was not sufficient to address the root causes of 
the deterioration in the public finances.  Other important reasons given for the poor fiscal 
performance between 1992 and 2000 are adverse external financial shocks, bad weather, 
and a dearth of accurate social and political consensus.155                                             
 The ERP was slow to take effect and positive results were not seen until 1992.156  
While under the ERP and prior to 1992, Guyana’s per capita income fell by 8 percent, 
consumption dropped by over 16 percent, and recorded output of all major agricultural 
and non-agricultural products fell.157  Some blame for these failures is attributed to bad 
weather, power shortages and industrial unrest.                                                            
 When the ERP policies did take root, however, several positive economical 
impacts were witnessed.  For example, GDP rose to 11 percent higher than it had been 
                                                 
152 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 142.   
153 Lexico Publishing Group, “Definition of Brain Drain,” LLC, Dictionary.com, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/brain%20drain (Accessed July 16, 2007). 
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 two years before.158  In fact, as illustrated later, GDP recovery continued to improve until 
1998.  Also, the balance-of-payments deficit declined substantially from US $158 million 
in 1992 to US $97 million in 1997.159  Additionally, this account deficit became 13 
percent of GDP, as compared to 93 percent of GDP in 1989.160                                  
 Privatization in Guyana engendered many positive effects.  For instance, the 
public sector became more efficient, and foreign direct investment, which had been 
negative throughout the 1980’s, rebounded strongly.161  Additionally, output of major 
exports increased by over 100 percent by 1999 from its levels in the 1980’s.162  
Furthermore, actions aimed towards deregulating the economy aided Guyana in several 
ways.  It increased Guyana’s overall efficiency of production, diversified its export base 
making it more resilient to external shocks, and increased international competition in the 
domestic market.163  Trade liberalization helped offset Guyana’s balance of payments 
crisis from the 1980’s to the 1990’s, which occurred as a result of “inward-oriented 
policies.”164  Such policies were generally restrictive of trade and preventative of outside 
competition.165  The IMF report states that the combination of a sharp recovery in 
economic growth following the implementation of structural adjustment and the 
strengthening of social programs resulted in poverty reduction.  It also claims that other 
benefits of these programs were the delivery of essential social services such as health 
and education.166                                                                                                                   
 The devaluation of the dollar, however, produced mixed results.  On the one hand, 
it caused the costs of good and services to increase, and as a result, a significant number 
of the population was no longer able to access and obtain certain goods and services due 
to the subsequent rises in the cost of living.  This led to severe underdevelopment and 
poverty. On the other hand, the IMF report states that this devaluation “helped make the 
                                                 
158 “Structural Adjustment and Agriculture in Guyana: From Crisis to Recovery. II. Economic Program, 
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 economy more competitive, encouraged private investment, and provided incentives to 
export.”167                                                                                                                         
 One of the components of underdevelopment and poverty was the creation of an 
underground economy wherein illegal trade existed, alongside the legal economy, as a 
means to avoid taxation.  As a result of this, the government’s ability to collect revenue 
was diminished, which in turn led to an increase in the cost of public services to the 
Guyanese people.   
Under the ERP’s successor, the HIPC, Guyana’s fiscal debt burden declined 
sharply.  This was only temporary, and, even though Guyana is receiving debt relief, 
debts still continue to grow due to the “magic of compound interest.”168  The most recent 
SAP, the Enhanced HIPC with PRS and its corresponding PSIP has still not been able to 
meet all the proposed goals.  For instance, Guyana’s economy has stagnated since 
1998,169 meaning that real GDP has not grown.  Therefore, it has not increased the 
productivity of either the public or private sectors.  The slowdown in growth, however, 
may not necessarily be attributed to the PRS itself, but to external conditions such as 
violent crime sprees, damage to agriculture on account of El Nino, and civil political 
disturbances.170 
 According to government publications, public sector investments have been 
successful, and have even increased.  For instance, more is being invested in the areas of 
education, water services, and roads.171  Increased public investment programs in the 
areas of agriculture and flood control have helped facilitate private sector activities in the 
mining sector.172  Other noteworthy introductions have been training programs provided 
to farmers; rehabilitation of health centers and increases in accessibility to health services 
for the poor; a housing program that focuses on distribution of housing lots and land 
titles.173  These strides have been very beneficial to the development of Guyana, 
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 improving the quality of life of its citizens, as well as the efficiency of the mining sector.  
This has therefore aided in reducing poverty levels.      
Following this period of fiscal adjustment, Guyana was able to make substantial 
progress.  Indicators of this success are the facts that the budget deficit was substantially 
reduced and expenditure control strengthened.174   In spite of the significant debt relief 
since 1989, however, Guyana still remains vulnerable because its “traditional exports are 
subject to volatility and uncertainties in preferential markets…”175  According to data 
projections, Guyana’s debt sustainability is expected to worsen by 2009.176  Therefore, 
while the PRS may help to reduce poverty, Guyana will still have balance-of-payment 
problems, which can only lead to the implementation of further structural adjustment 
programs.  This represents a failure of neoliberal policies to achieve some measure of 
improved long-term economic efficiency.  In spite of its failings, however, the PRSP 
process has been helpful in some regard.  For instance, it has helped to refocus “national 
and international agendas on poverty eradication and increased public engagement in 
select issues in a number of low-income countries.”177   
While the aforementioned programs had general effects on Guyana’s economy 
and society, further effects of these strategies will now be discussed in relation to three of 
Guyana’s most lucrative and pivotal industries:  logging, mining, and sugar.   
 
Effects on Specific Industries 
Logging 
Description of Industry and Associated SAPs       
Guyana is well known for its abundant forestry, having more than 75 percent 
(50,000 square miles) of its 83,000 square miles covered by woods.178  ‘Forest products’ 
is a general term that encompasses various types of wood such as lumber, firewood, 
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 fuelwood, poles, and sawnwood.  These types, among several others are exported from 
Guyana.179  Forest products are primarily exported to the Asian, Caribbean and North 
American markets, 180 as well as Europe.181  This industry contributes approximately 5 
percent to the Guyana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).182  Greenheart (Chlorocardium 
rodiei) was, until recently, the major timber species in Guyana and is considered to be 
one of the most valuable and high quality timbers in the world. It is no longer Guyana’s 
major species, as it now ranks third in abundance.  Additionally, there are approximately 
1,000 tree species in Guyana.183 
Due to the vast abundance and excellent quality of Guyanese forests, the logging 
industry is a major source of livelihood for many Guyanese, providing both direct and 
indirect employment for about 20,000 persons.184  The workforce is poorly trained,185 
which leads to longer time periods for production and thus higher costs.  This can cause 
substantial monetary losses within the industry.  The inadequate training also increases 
the risk of on-the-job accidents.     
 Since such a large industry needs substantial regulation, the Guyana Forestry 
Commission (GFC) plays this role.  The GFC is responsible for the administration and 
management of all forestland and advises the appropriate Minister on issues relating to 
forestry laws and policy and forest regulations.  Their mission is to “provide excellence 
in forestry management service to our stakeholders through the application of 
professional skills to contribute to our nation’s development.”  Their vision is to be 
dynamic and professional and respected by local and international stakeholders.186   The 
mission and vision cannot be fully implemented, since due to budget austerity, the 
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 Guyana Forestry Commission lacks the trained foresters essential for monitoring and 
regulating the logging industry.  It could be surmised that this mission and vision of 
catering to the stakeholders, especially international, could be problematic because of the 
constant need to appease international stakeholders, which might eventually lead to 
tactics and policies that compromise national and local development.   
 During Burnham’s era of Cooperative Socialism, foreign companies “steered 
clear” of Guyana.  At this time, only small-scale logging was carried out in the coastal 
forests with outdated machinery.  Loggers focused only on the best trees of the choicest 
timbers.187  Which was necessary to ensure the wood was of the best quality. This meant 
that Guyana’s forests were not suffering the problems of depletion that many other 
countries at the time were undergoing.  Logging there was selective and less damaging.  
However, forests that were once protected by their isolation and species diversity in the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Borneo were rapidly being depleted due to a trend of capital-
intensive logging to meet increases in world demand for timber.  Logging in these 
countries was more indiscriminate and thus, damaging.  Between 1978 and 1987, the 
World Bank made efforts to initiate this trend in Guyana by investing over US $35 
million in a state owned company called Demerara Woods Ltd. in an effort to exploit 
what they called the largest stand of Greenheart in the world.188  Some of this money 
went towards a sawmill and a wood gasification plant, neither of which ever operated 
efficiently.  For this reason, as well as poor financial management and lack of 
institutional oversight, the company ran into debt.  Burnham adopted a full-blown 
structural adjustment program in 1986 due to pressure from the World Bank and IMF.189  
This plan called for a rapid increase in logging.190      
Since privatization is one of the elements of SAPs and neoliberalism, in the early 
1990’s, as part of the ERP, the Guyanese government (PNC) granted concessions to 
transnational firms such as the Barama Co. (Malaysian-South Korean owned) for over 
half of the country’s harvestable forestland. This company was also awarded benefits 
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 such as a ten-year tax holiday and a 25-year licence.191  Still prominent in Guyana’s 
logging industry today, the 2005 Budget states that Barama Co. was awarded a 
concession in the amount of US$35 million for a new sawmilling complex and 2 wood-
processing plants along the Essequibo River.192  In May of 2007, the Chairman of 
Barama, Girwar Lalaram, stated that US$10 million would be added to this sum in order 
to ensure increased value in its production of forest products.193  The outcome of this 
particular project is later discussed in the section covering the effects of SAPs in 
Guyana’s logging industry.   
 
Effects of SAPs on Logging Industry 
   
Structural adjustment policies have had a significant impact on Guyana’s logging 
industry.  For instance, the production of forest products has increased dramatically since 
Barama’s operations began.194  This operation could potentially benefit Guyana’s 
economy since the increased output will supposedly create more revenue.  The 2005 
Barama project claimed it would create 500 new jobs, open road links, and improve 
power supply in the Essequibo area,195 thus achieving great strides in improving the well 
being and livelihoods of Guyanese citizens.  However, to date, this project has not 
achieved its stated goals and objectives.  The company has recently claimed that a 
shortage of local skilled labor is affecting the setting up of the plant.  Therefore, it has 
been training managers in Malaysia to work in Guyana with the new technology.196  Such 
outsourcing of jobs cannot be beneficial to the Guyanese economy.  Alternatively, the 
Barama Company could have trained the local ‘unskilled’ labor to become managers for 
the new plant.  The possibility would then exist for increased employment rates in 
Guyana, as well as providing members of the population with valuable managerial skills.   
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  Furthermore, the deleterious impact of SAPs and privatization soon became 
evident as there was massive degradation visited upon Greenheart trees, which were the 
focus of the logging enterprises.  Perhaps this focus existed because it was the most 
plentiful and high-quality timber, and therefore would prove to be a reliable target for 
structural adjustment.  However, in retrospect, this may not have been the wisest choice 
since Greenheart has a very slow growth rate.  According to results of Greenheart studies 
from 1924, 1964, and 1999, it was found that the tree population had declined by 63 
percent over a 75-year period.197  Some of this depletion undoubtedly can be attributed to 
the low-impact logging performed by local concessions up to the time of SAP 
implementation. Statistics show that the depletion rate is 43 percent for both periods 
1924-1964 as well as 1964-1999.198  It is important to note that the second time period is 
shorter yet exhibits the same depletion levels.  More importantly, measurements indicated 
that the Diameter at Breast Height (DBH) of the trees was greater than 40 cm in 1924, but 
greater than 30 cm in 1964 and 1999.199  This smaller size illustrates that the significant 
decline of Greenheart has produced less than an equal regeneration response.   
Underdevelopment in Guyana is a result, due to the depletion of these valuable resources 
to the point of extinction.  If extinction does occur, this resource will no longer be 
available for industry purposes, and not profitable to the Guyanese economy, thus 
incurring monetary losses.   
The 2004 Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) report states that an 
increase in logging and mining practices has been the major cause of increases in malaria 
in already malaria-prone areas.  The mining and logging operators, with their access to 
foreign exchange, purchased antimalarials and used them indiscriminately to suppress 
symptoms. The improper use of these drugs causes problems with diagnosis and can 
enhance problems with stable resistance to the disease.200  The proliferation of these 
diseases undermines public health and adds to the health care costs of the state and its 
citizens.  
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  In addition to health and environmental issues, Guyana has also experienced 
monetary losses in the form of governmental revenue.  For instance, these international 
logging firms pay very little taxes.  In fact, when harvesting in Guyana, they pay the 
lowest taxes in the world’s tropical timber industry.201  Barama, for example, enjoys a 
ten-year tax holiday.  This includes income, corporate, withholding, consumption, and 
property taxes.  They also do not pay income duties on supplies such as machinery, fuel, 
and building materials.202  The loss of these taxes as a source of revenue is extremely 
detrimental to Guyana’s economy.   
The aim of privatization was supposedly to bring in more revenues to reduce the 
deficit.  In Guyana’s case, this did not occur, but instead resulted in the Guyanese 
government deriving little economic gain from the exponential depletion of its forests. 
Such tax holidays are therefore not economically beneficial to Guyana and the fiscal 
results thus far achieved do not correlate with the proposed goals of SAPs and 
privatization--to achieve economic growth.  According to Teeple, the reason for these tax 
exemptions is part of the strategy of “conformity of tax policy around the world to 
accommodate the needs of internationalized capital.”203  This is one reason why 
transnational corporations can demand tax concessions from national governments as an 
incentive for them to invest.204  However, it creates a growing tax burden on the working 
population, in particular, the middle and lower classes.  This promotes underdevelopment 
as it impoverishes sectors of the population.   
 Guyana’s indigenous peoples, the Amerindians have also been adversely affected 
by the logging concessions. Currently, in Guyana, there are 40,000 to 45,000 
Amerindians, and their lands comprise 16 percent of the country, which includes 10 to 15 
percent of the state forest.  Some, though it is unclear exactly what percentage, work in 
the logging industry.205  Since Guyanese law does not subject forests on private lands to 
GFC control, timber companies have been entering into formal and often informal 
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 agreements with Amerindian communities and the activities of some of the companies 
have been highly questionable if not blatantly illegal. 
More recently, the Barama Company has disregarded pre-existing Amerindian 
claims and titles.  As a result, its concession encloses four Amerindian communities and 
several other homesteads.206  While such acts are seemingly illegal, unfortunately, 
according to Guyanese law, “forests on private lands, including those titled to 
Amerindian communities, are not subject to the control of the Guyana Forestry 
Commission and no special laws or regulations exist to regulate felling.”207  Therefore, 
the logging in these areas is unregulated and lacks supervision or control.  The 
Amerindian Peoples’ Association (APA) made efforts to establish a Commission of 
Enquiry to review the Barama contract and the Amerindians rights, since many of them 
did not even know that they were living within a forestry concession owned by a foreign 
logging company.  However, after much stalling and urging by NGOs and international 
supporters, to date, this Commission has not been established.208     
As a result of these incongruities, many of Guyana’s Amerindian communities 
have fallen victim to machinations by logging companies, as well as victims to diseases 
and other ills.  Environmental degradation, which includes deforestation, contamination 
of water supplies and an erasure of flora and fauna have led to various health concerns.  
For example, many Amerindians now lack access to traditional foods, shelter and other 
forest resources, since the logging activities reduce or eliminate these items.  Another 
reason they lack access to traditional foods is because they can no longer practice 
rotational agriculture, as it would encroach on the company’s concession.209  Also, water 
sources have been contaminated from spills of wood preservatives, insecticides and 
fungicides.  These along with the diseases that the incomers bring210 have led to the 
Amerindians acquiring new diseases and a general worsening of their health conditions.   
Amerindians traditionally have very strong spiritual and cultural ties to the land.  
Barama’s disregard of this fact has therefore led to a destruction of their culture.  It has 
also led to a demise of their livelihoods, health, and family structures.  Since many 
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 Amerindian men and women are employed in the logging camps, a drain of cheap labour 
follows, which “deprives the communities of the hands needed to plant next year’s crops, 
hunt, fish and build, as well as to carry on cultural traditions that have held the groups 
together for generations.”211  This creates divisions within the community as well as 
within individual families.   
  
Reforms                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                     
 Several positive reforms have been suggested to alleviate the negative impacts of 
IMF and WB strategies.  One of them is the Iwokrama International Rain Forest Program, 
which was implemented in by the PPP in 1996 via a landmark law, when President 
Jagan’s administration thought it was necessary to protect some areas from development 
activities due to the previous lack thereof.212  With this program, the Government of 
Guyana showed great leadership by dedicating almost 400,000 hectares of lowland rain 
forest to demonstrate sustainable forest use.213  Specifically, this initiative helps demand 
demarcation of this area for low-impact sustainable use to avoid threats from logging 
agreements and development proposals.  The goal is to assist with the promotion of 
biodiversity conservation in Guyana.214  In order to be fully effective, Iwokrama should 
effectively form partnerships with the private sector and persuade them to adopt the 
innovations that Iwokrama members have developed, tested, and demonstrated.  Part of 
the program includes conducting research and demonstration activities outside of the 
Iwokrama area on commercial logging concessions and with Amerindian villages.215  
This is required to reduce tension and frustration experienced by the Amerindians over 
still-undemarcated lands that they claim.216  Based on these results, one can speculate that 
the private sector may not initially feel compelled to consult with Iwokrama on these 
projects due to the fact that they would be expending time and resources for no monetary 
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 gain.  This would detract from their current enterprises and the logging industry as a 
whole.   
Donors are essential for this program in part because Guyana already faces cash 
challenge tradeoffs between short-term needs for spending on social and political needs 
and long-term needs for sustainable development.  Another reason is that the boost of 
foreign support could help the government resist offers from foreign investors with 
dubious track records.217  These investments represent a unique resource for promoting 
basic and applied research in Guyana's forests, and should attract foreign scientists and 
funds. The funds and collaboration with other scientists will assist in the development of 
new technologies, markets, and revenue-generating forest-based industries that would be 
of benefit to Guyana and the region.218                                                                                                               
 To increase donor interest, some short-term priorities have been suggested.  They 
would be donor funded and should help the logging industry recover.  First, Guyana can 
strengthen links with other countries in the region that are experienced in reformulating 
forestry and related policies to promote sustainable development; this would help cover 
the costs of information exchange.  For example, Costa Rica recently offered assistance 
to Suriname in this area.  Therefore, it is likely they would be willing to assist Guyana as 
well.219  Such assistance would depend, however, on Costa Rica’s available time and 
resources.                                                                                                                        
 Secondly, a twofold program to help make the forest-based industry 
environmentally friendly, while assisting Guyana establish credit-worthiness with an aim 
to access lower foreign credit rates would be beneficial. This program would need to be 
separate from any World Bank or IMF programs to ensure impartiality in its operations.  
Thirdly, donors for sustainable community enterprises could provide small grants and 
loans in the form of a rapid response initiative.  Some of these would be non-timber 
based development, sustainable agriculture, and basic training in financial management.  
These community efforts would, by definition have civil society underpinnings, thus 
giving the citizens more control over the outcomes.  In addition to these three main 
initiatives, forest use by the foreign corporations and their employees should be closely 
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 monitored and the law diligently enforced.  The Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC) can 
assist with this law enforcement, which would have the added benefit of providing 
employment for locals.  Finally, creativity and alternatives to traditional timber should be 
investigated.220   
 The above-suggested projects need to have a short term as well as a long-term 
agenda.  The Guyanese government would be responsible for long-term commitment, but 
would need adequate support from citizens and donors alike. These donors could be, for 
example, USAID, the World Bank, the European Union, and the U.N. agencies.  While 
the World Bank is in fact one of the agencies promoting SAPs, this may be perhaps be a 
strategic move because they would be lending even more assistance and thus it would 
appear as if they were attempting to right some of the wrongs they themselves have 
caused.  The average cost of these programs would be no more than $100 million per 
year.221  The donors should therefore encourage the government to resist the “short term 
temptation to award more large logging concessions.  Many small countries such as 
Guyana are rich in timber but poor in the government and civil machinery needed to 
withstand predatory foreigners as their economies rapidly open up.”222  The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the world’s largest multilateral source of 
development assistance, has the mandate to lead donor coordination in Guyana, and holds 
regular meetings, but was not very effective on forest-related issues at the time.223   
Donor activity has also engendered positive action.  For instance, perhaps the 
most significant was led by the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
and called for a moratorium on large concessions of new Timber Sales Agreements and 
Wood Cutting Leases until the ODA’s Guyana Forestry Commission Support project 
reached its three-year objectives.224  These objectives included providing foreign 
assistance to strengthen the Forestry Commission and for policy and legal reform.225  
These objectives were not entirely fulfilled, as evidenced by declining amounts of foreign 
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 investment for the duration of this moratorium.226  This meant that the economic viability 
of existing concessions did not improve substantially.  In spite of these shortcomings, 
large concessions once again began to be granted.227  Additionally, guidelines for 
maximizing the effectiveness of the planned Guyanese Environmental Protection Agency 
(GEPA),228 and other basic conditions of assistance should be rigorously upheld.  
 The World Resources Institute has put forth the idea that not only should reforms 
take place on a local level, but the IFIs can enact change as well.  Armed with the 
statistical proof that their actions have caused irreparable damage to Guyana’s economy 
and environment, the IFIs should be required to “review the current and the proposed 
SAPs prior to implementation to ensure that none of its components promote degradation 
of the forest resource base or have undue negative impacts on local communities.”229  I 
think that if they do violate environmental laws or if their business practices destroy the 
economy or the environment, IFI programs that are ongoing should be discontinued, 
regardless of monetary losses to the IFIs or Guyana.  Proposed programs should be 
redrafted and aligned to improve the environmental and economic needs of the country.  
 Pivotal in the evaluation process could be the GFC.  They could collaborate with 
the IFIs to determine the best avenues to ensure economic prosperity and environmental 
improvements.  There might be objections to this collaboration on the grounds that the 
IFIs economic objectives may be at odds with the GFC’s environmental ones.  While 
such disagreements can lead to standstills in negotiations, it is an advisable move because 
the GFC experts will have a better knowledge of the Guyanese forests than would IFI 
officials.  Especially worthy of attention are the promotion of foreign investment and tax 
administration reform.230   
Additionally, a ‘Friends of the Earth’ report on the environmental ills committed 
by the environment, suggested that the IMF could implement ‘green taxes,’ and establish 
                                                 
226 Jyrki Salmi and Kelvin Craig, “Study on Forest Sector Financing in Guyana,” United Nations 
Development Commission Guyana Forestry Commission Program on Forests Profor Guyana, March 5, 
2004, http://www.freewebs.com/gnifc/pdf/StudyonForestSectorFinancinginGuyana.PDF (Accessed 
October 10, 2007), 64-66.    
227 Andrew Mendes and Duncan Macqueen, “Raising Forest Revenues and Employment: Unlocking the 
Potential of Small and Medium Forest Enterprises in Guyana,” International Institute for Environment and 
Development, 2006, http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/13523IIED.pdf (Accessed October 5, 2007), 14.   
228 The GEPA was created in 1997, following the 1996 publication of Sizer’s article.   
229 World Resources Institute, “Recommendations for Action.”  
230 Sizer, “Profit Without Plunder,” 29.    
 46
 an independent evaluation unit to assess IMF policies and programs.  This would improve 
IMF accountability.  The report further states that instead of using VAT to build 
governments’ capacity to collect taxes, it could encourage the generation of substantial 
taxes from large industrial producers and resource extractors.  This would influence 
economic activity directed towards the environment.  It would also assist Guyana in the 
promotion of environmental goals because they could then provide incentives for 
manufacturers to alter their production practices.  In turn, this could improve Guyana’s 
economic competitiveness since it might encourage more efficient energy and resource 
use and prevention of environmental contamination and degradation.231  However, it is 
probable that this scheme this would cause the IMF to lose money.  They would thus 
require financial or other incentives to encourage Guyana to implement green taxes.  
It is this author’s contention that GFC shares part of the blame in permitting the 
depletion of Greenheart, since their mission is to monitor and regulate the logging 
industry.  Logging therefore should not have been so narrowly focused on one species of 
tree (the Greenheart), but rather the harvesting should have been performed 
systematically on different species of trees, which would have allowed ample time for 
regeneration.  An analysis of growth rates of different species should have been 
conducted in advance of the implementation of logging SAPs.  Retrospectively, therefore, 
the GFC is doing its part to implement positive reforms.  It has recognized its errors and 
recently changed its Greenheart harvesting guidelines from a 20-year rotation cycle to a 
60-year cycle.232  The government and regulatory bodies along with conservation 
agencies in Guyana therefore need to be more proactive rather than reactive to ensure the 
preservation and conservation of natural resources for the benefit of the people and 
economy of Guyana.                   
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 Mining 
Description of Industry and Associated SAPs 
                                                                                                                               
 Guyana is very rich in mineral resources and consequently, bauxite, diamonds, 
gold, crushed stone and semiprecious stones are mined.233  Gold and bauxite are two of 
the country’s largest mineral exports and represent about one-fifth of Guyana’s GDP.234  
The bauxite industry has achieved mediocre success when compared with the gold 
industry, which represents 32 percent of Guyanese exports.235  Approximately 37 
transnational mining companies (mostly Canadian) have been registered in Guyana.236 
Several of the mining companies are present in the Upper Mazaruni area of Guyana.  As 
mentioned in the logging section, there is an abundance of these companies in this area 
due to the fact that the rivers in this vicinity allow for easy transportation.  The scope of 
this paper does not allow discussion of all these companies and their individual impacts 
on Guyana.  Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, only LINMINE and BERMINE 
(formerly GUYMINE), Cambior, Golden Star Resources, and the Omai Gold Mine will 
be discussed.   
The mining industry is very important to the Guyanese economy and work force.    
The 1993 Statistical Bureau's Household Survey indicated that 9,836 persons were 
employed in the mining and quarrying sector, which is approximately 4 percent of the 
then estimated labour force of 245,492.237  The bauxite industry has highly skilled 
workers and those in other industries, such as gold, are continually developing and 
upgrading their skills.  Therefore, at the sub-professional and professional levels more 
and more Guyanese are being trained in the fields of mining engineering, geology, data 
management, assaying, gem appraisal, occupational health and safety, drilling, contract 
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 negotiations, feasibility studies.238  It is significant that highly skilled workers and 
professionals become an integral participant in the mining industry, since it is rather 
dangerous due to use of machinery and chemicals.  The more highly skilled the workers, 
the more unlikely it will be for mining accidents and potential revenue losses to occur.  
As noted above, a large number of transnational mining companies currently exist 
in Guyana.  This is due to the fact that privatization of the mines was a requirement under 
the HIPC debt relief program. After the government allowed majority holdings by 
foreigners,239 corporations from Australia, France, Brazil, North Korea and Yugoslavia 
began moving in.240  Additionally, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission 
(GGMC) actively promoted foreign investment and participation in the country’s
development.
 mineral 
                                                
241  These actions are in line with the neoliberal rationale of privatization.     
 In 1992, GUYMINE was dissolved and divided into the Linden Mining 
Enterprise Limited (LINMINE) and Berbice Mining Enterprise (BERMINE) due to 
heavy debt.  These two companies were then privatized as a requirement of the Enhanced 
HIPC.  The purpose of this was to eliminate government subsidies242 thus freeing up 
more money for the government to apply elsewhere and allowing the private sector to be 
completely self-sufficient without using money that the government needed for other 
projects.  As a result, this initiative promised to boost the economy as a whole.  
LINMINE was overseen by Minproc Engineers Ltd. of Australia, as part of the 
restructuring arrangement with the World Bank between 1992 and 1994.243  Due to lack 
of new investment, LINMINE failed as a privatized entity, which is the reason that 
Minproc’s contract expired in 1994.   
  Another company, Cambior Inc., which is Canadian in origin, owns 65 percent 
of the Omai Gold Mines Limited in Guyana.  They have a consortium with Golden Star 
Resources Ltd. (U.S.), which owns 30 percent of these mines, and the Guyanese 
government, which owns 5 percent.244  The Omai Gold Mines consortium planned to 
 
238 NDS Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, “Mining Policy.”  
239 As noted earlier, such extensive ownership by foreign corporations was not allowed under during the 
time of Guyana’s extensive nationalization.   
240 Resource Center of the Americas (RCA), “Fool’s Gold.”  http://www.americas.org/item_127.  
241 Gurmendi, “The Mineral Industry of Guyana,” 1.   
242 Egoumé-Bossogo et al., 139.  
243 “Bauxite Industry in Guyana,” 2000, www.guyanaguide.com/bauxite.html (Accessed May 16, 2007).    
244 Gurmendi, “The Mineral Industry of Guyana,” 4.   
 49
 mine 250,000 ounces of gold annually during its first three years, beginning in 1993,and 
tapering off to 200,000 ounces per year after that. Only five percent of the gold went to 
the Guyanese. Guyana was supposed to benefit from an income tax paid by Cambior 
incorporated on the remaining portion of the gold (95 percent) at the rate of 33 percent 
for the first seven years and 45 percent after that.245  The production levels were effective 
and were even increased after two years.246  It was recently found, however, that no taxes 
were in fact paid to the government.247    
 
Effects of SAPs on Mining Industry 
 
Positive impacts have resulted from the IMF and WB Strategies.  For instance, 
under the ERP, output from mining doubled.248  This was because privatization and 
restructuring of the public sector led to increased efficiency in the public sector and 
encouraged more private sector development.249  Additionally, the Linden Economic 
Advancement Program (LEAP) was created to use development funding to stimulate 
small-scale entrepreneur activity in the area due to the economic downturn from the 
bauxite mining.250  LEAP provides 12 million Euros over a seven-year period to finance 
technical assistance, micro-finance programs and investment in economic 
infrastructure.251 
 At the same time, however, the mining industry has contributed little to overall 
development in Guyana.   While at first glance it would appear that structural adjustment 
in the mining industry would improve the economy and livelihoods of the Guyanese 
people, SAPs have in fact accomplished neither of these goals.  This is because the 
economic conditions are so deplorable that today many Guyanese are still forced to turn 
to small-scale mining.  The Mining Act of 1989 promoted involvement in the small-scale 
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 sector.  In order to comply with the requirements of privatization and neoliberal policies, 
the Guyanese government sought “private investment for the exploitation of mineral 
deposits.”  It did this by stipulating in the act that small and medium-scale mining was 
limited to Guyanese citizens, while mandating that only foreigners could engage in large-
scale mining.252   
It is estimated that 40,000 people, including 10,000 Brazilian garimpeiros 
participate in small-scale mining in Guyana, a majority of them illegally.253  Small-scale 
mining tends to be extremely destructive, both environmentally and health-wise as a 
result of the poor monitoring, primitive extraction and processing techniques, and lack of 
financial resources.254  The result is poor monitoring since the Guyanese government is 
unable to properly monitor this sector because Guyana’s “poor economic standing 
coupled with fraud and corruption within the environmental regulatory bodies impair its 
ability to monitor mining activities effectively.”255  Furthermore, the government is 
cautious about visiting too many regulations upon small-scale mining since it supplies 
revenue and employs some of the poorest segments of the population.256   
The Mining Act is problematic for by prohibiting Guyanese citizens from 
engaging in large-scale mining, the government is doing a great disservice to the 
employment needs of its people, as well as denying them opportunities to develop their 
business skills and owning the assets of the productive, economic, income-generating 
resources of their country.  
 It can be argued that the Guyanese do not have the resources to perform large-
scale mining. But if they are not encouraged to partake in such activities or their access to 
financial and other resources is limited or non-existent, they will be relegated to the 
small-scale mining sector, where poor wages and conditions abound.   
SAPs have also negatively affected Guyanese workers in other ways as well.  For 
instance, when the Australian Firm, Minproc, was contracted to manage the Linden 
Mining Enterprise Limited (LINMINE) Bauxite mine, they essentially cut the work force 
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 in half.257 Also, the 2002 contracting of Cambior to mine ore led to massive layoffs, 
because this company used a different method of ore extraction that required fewer 
workers.  The community had already experienced a high rate of unemployment258 and 
further unemployment was detrimental to the community.  This is an example of how 
utilizing multinational corporations to achieve economic efficiency actually hindered 
Guyana’s economic development by depriving several citizens of their livelihoods.   
As a result, in 1995, The UK aid agency, DFID, contracted the Adam Smith 
Institute to study the implication of the LINMINE reform.259  This report identified 
concerns about impacts of privatization on the community, economic benefits, and public 
services.  The report also recommended strong government support to mitigate negative 
impacts.  While beneficial, the publishing of such a report seems to be mere tokenism, 
since little is being done to offset the negative effects mentioned therein.           
 Both large and small-scale mining has been very detrimental to the environment, 
as it has transformed local ecosystems into polluted waterways, destroyed forests and 
ruined soil quality.  In 1995, a dam belonging to the Omai gold mine burst, leaking 3.5 
million cubic meters of toxic wastes260 into the Essequibo River.  The wastes included 
cyanide and heavy metals, therefore poisoning fish and reducing the livelihoods of 
thousands or residents who relied on the river for their incomes and meals.  It is 
important to note that before this mine was opened both the World Bank and the 
Guyanese government approved an Environmental Impact statement. Yet, the London-
based environmental group Minewatch predicted in March of 1994 that a serious accident 
was inevitable because the tailing pond for the wastes was inadequate.261  However, the 
mine continued operating even after a smaller leakage in May of that year killed hundreds 
of fish in the Omai River. According to Survival International, "the short term effects of 
the cyanide discharges include severe skin burns, lethal food poisoning and the death of 
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 livestock and fish."  Furthermore, "Its long-term environmental and social impact can 
only be guessed at." 262                 
  Further environmental destruction is caused by the mining methods and 
chemicals used in mining.  Missile dredging, for instance, involves using enormous 
vacuum cleaners that are used to remove alluvial deposits along the river dredges.  
Riverbanks and forests, along with the existing fragile ecosystems and habitats, are 
thereby destroyed. This results in an increase in sedimentation in the rivers, which has led 
to a loss in fish populations and the resulting destruction of fragile ecosystems.  Another 
issue is that the mercury used to maximize gold production potentially destroys and 
negatively impacts the existing ecosystems, as well as the health of humans.   The rivers 
are heavily discoloured and full of so much sediment that piles of debris accumulate at 
the riverbanks.  This is detrimental because the cloudy waters have caused fish stocks to 
crash, negatively affecting the Amerindian diet.  Also, the debris creates mud, which can 
choke flora and fauna.263  Furthermore, liquid sodium cyanide, a dangerous chemical, is 
the catalyst that separates gold ore from base deposits.  For every ton of gold mined, 3 
million tons of waste rock is churned up.264  This seems to have a great impact on 
Guyana’s “biologically rich territory.”265  When the land is blasted, pulverized and filled 
with liquid sodium cyanide, it undoubtedly affects the 1,000 tree species, 8,000 plant 
species, and 1,000 types of terrestrial animals existent in Guyana.266   
 The aforementioned changes in mine management also affected the community’s 
supply of electricity.  Electricity was privatized in 1999 under the PRS.267  The new 
management ushered in under privatization failed to invest in equipment, causing the 
electricity supply to the surrounding town to become increasingly erratic.268  To address 
this problem, Cambior brought in generators for the bauxite mining, but used it solely for 
their purposes and did not deliver electricity to the town and nearby communities.269  
This has been an ongoing point of contention between the residents and Cambior.  For 
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 some it might be difficult to choose sides in this situation, since there are no laws 
stipulating that the international companies should provide electricity for the residents.   
Perhaps, however, Cambior has a moral obligation to provide electricity since the 
companies are indeed utilizing Guyana’s natural resources for substantial monetary gain.  
Furthermore, since they have not paid taxes, providing electricity to the residents from 
their generators may be considered a small price to pay. 
Not only are the foreign owned companies to blame for the suffering of the 
Guyanese people, but the government is also not doing its part to protect its citizens. It 
did not ensure that the IFI policies were environmentally sound prior to their 
implementation.  Furthermore, now that environmental degradation has indeed occurred, 
the government has failed to implement measures that could protect its citizens from soil 
erosion, sedimentation, deforestation and runoff.  As far back as 1993, the World Bank 
warned that the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission lacked environmental controls 
and scientists.270  If these warnings were heeded, the Omai dam burst discussed earlier 
could have been avoided.   
 As was seen in the case on logging, SAPs introduced in the mining sector have 
also had negative effects on the Amerindian community.  The aforementioned Upper 
Mazaruni area is heavily populated by Amerindians who are living on reserves.  In 
colonial times, legislation existed to prevent mining districts from being erected in 
Amerindian reserves.  However, the colonial powers circumvented this legislation in the 
1930’s by de-reserving the Mazaruni area so they could open it to mining.  Following the 
discovery of diamonds there in 1959, the PPP excised and gazetted the area as a mining 
district.  In other words, this area was specifically reserved for that purpose.  Finally, in 
1977, the PNC passed regulations that allowed the area to be opened up to full-scale 
diamond mining. By 1978, the entire area was declared a mining area.  While in 1991, the 
Amerindians were granted some titles to a small part of the reserve, mining was still 
allowed in the areas between these titles.   
The previous actions of the colonial administrations, the PPP and PNC have 
paved the path for multinational companies to secure exploration rights to search the 
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 whole area, including titled lands.271  This has significantly impacted on the livelihoods 
of the Amerindian communities.  For example, while mining provides employment for 
the male Amerindians, it takes them away from family farming duties such as clearing 
the land and fishing. This leaves women and children to bear the load.  As a result, family 
tensions have increased.272  Also, many Amerindians gave up their subsistence farming 
for jobs in the mines.  This led to their destitution when the mines began to close.273  
Additionally, health problems ensued when miners introduced new diseases for 
which the Amerindians had no immunity.  Mosquitoes lived in the braided stream beds 
and pools left over from mining, exposing most of those who lived in this area to malaria.  
Also, tuberculosis has become quite prevalent, due to the lack of hygiene and poor 
nutrition in mining areas.  Dietary problems have also been created by the large-scale 
mining. Game animals that inhabit the areas surrounding the river are scared off by the 
noise caused by mining and the unsustainable hunting done by miners, thus affecting the 
Amerindians’ livelihoods and diets.274   
 As a result, many Amerindians have therefore moved out of their titled areas.  
While this may seem like a good idea, health-wise, by moving, they are leaving behind 
services such as schooling and healthcare, which are provided by the government.275  
Indigenous people are therefore relinquishing their land to foreign multinationals without 
any benefit to themselves.   
 
Reforms 
                                                                                                                              
 The problems stemming from mining and SAPS have been allowed to continue 
because there are no environmental guidelines built into the SAPs.  While many of the 
questionable methods discussed above are necessary to extract the maximum amount of 
mineral in a given time frame, restraint should be exercised, along with the 
implementation of written guidelines or laws to ensure the protection of the environment, 
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 and more importantly, to minimize the damage so as not to compromise future 
excavations of minerals.  
Therefore, reforms have been suggested to alleviate the negative impacts of 
structural adjustment in the mining sector.  One such suggestion is to refocus government 
resources that are currently used to subsidize mining, on health education and other ‘basic 
services’.276  The Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) performed an analysis of 
the bauxite reform, and found that substantial benefits could be achieved if tax 
exemptions for the mining companies were eliminated.277  It may be difficult, however, 
to impose taxes on organizations that were initially granted 10-year tax holidays as
condition of their contract.   
 a 
                                                
Another reform was the formation of the Guyanese Environmental Protection 
Agency (GEPA), which was created in 1997.  This followed the aforementioned accident 
at the Omai Gold Mines.  It requires and environmental impact assessment (EIA) for all 
mining operations.  Furthermore, a detailed EIA is part of the mining license process.  
Specifically, mining companies must observe environmental guidelines.  They must 
design tailing dams to prevent milling or leaching discharges, prevent mercury 
contamination of soil and water and use large dredges in the Essequibo River, which 
causes less damage.278  While beneficial, this is a reactive rather than a proactive 
measure.  Less environmental damage would have occurred if these measures were taken 
proactively.   
 
Sugar      
Description of Industry and Associated SAPs                              
 
The sugar industry is extremely important to understanding Guyana’s 
development because the economy was essentially founded on the sugar plantations.  In 
fact, “…sugar has been the major formative influence in [Guyanese] history.”279   As 
discussed in the Historical and Economic Chapter, the Guyanese economy began with 
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 the sugar industry when slaves and indentured laborers were initially brought to Guyana 
to work on the sugar plantations.  It was on the sugar plantations that the first colonial 
machinations by the British were witnessed.  In fact, there existed a comparative situation 
to that of today’s structural adjustment packages.  For instance, in 1795, a large 
proportion of the sugar crop—approximately 15 million pounds—was sent to Britain to 
pay off debts to British merchants, which were incurred when setting up the sugar 
estates.280    
 The British influence continued, so that by 1904, four separate British firms 
controlled eighty percent of Guyana’s sugar industry.281  Today, Guyana still does not 
have complete control over its sugar industry and continues to be a victim of neo-
colonialism, in that within this industry the IMF and World Bank exercise control. This 
industry is still extremely important today because Guyana supplies 300,000 tons of 
sugar per year282 and accounts for approximately 20 percent of GDP and 60 percent of 
gross agricultural product (GAP).283   Because of its importance to the economy, it too, 
like mining and logging was the target of SAPs.  
Cultivated in the coastal regions,284 sugar is Guyana’s largest foreign exchange 
earner, providing 23 percent of foreign exchange earnings.  It is also the biggest corporate 
contributor to public revenue.285  The Guyana Sugar Company (GUYSUCO) controls all 
sugar production and processing.  Since 1996, Booker Tate Ltd, a British company, has 
managed GUYSUCO.286   
Over 90 percent of Guyana’s total raw sugar production is exported and 
approximately 95 percent of these exports are sold under preferential arrangements with 
the EU and US.287  The sugar industry, much like that of logging, is also a major source 
of employment, absorbing approximately 21,000 persons, which is 17 percent of the 
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 Guyanese workforce.  In addition to this, an additional 8,000 are employed in linkage 
activities.288  Overall, the sugar industry provides livelihood for 75,000 people.289    
 While a large and quite profitable industry, it suffered setbacks in the 70’s and 
80’s due to poor governmental policies such as:  
…restrictions on the proportion of export earnings which GUYSUCO could retain 
as foreign exchange.  (Retaining revenue as foreign exchange would have enabled 
the company to defend the purchasing power of its revenues to a greater extent).  
The exchange rate regime also created a dual foreign currency market, in which 
goods were exported at the official (overvalued) rate, but limited importer 
agricultural inputs could be financed at a parallel exchange rate which better 
reflected the true (higher) value of foreign exchange in domestic currency terms.  
GUYSUCO was frequently denied access even to the parallel foreign exchange 
market for purposes of importing capital equipment.  The industry therefore 
experienced a profound deterioration of infrastructure and rapid decapitalisation 
in the late eighties.290 
 
These problems made sugar, one of the nation’s core industries a target for SAPs.  
GUYSUCO’s management by Booker Tate was one of the World Bank conditions for 
HIPC debt relief.  It was part of a modernization plan for GUYSUCO that had a deadline 
of November 2000.291  The objectives of this modernization plan were covered in the 
World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) loan agreements for the sugar 
industry.  The aim was to assist Guyana to increase its resource output and to be able to 
do so at internationally competitive prices.  As a condition of the loans, production costs 
needed to be dropped and production expanded. 
The 1996 PRSC documents outlined programs for expanding production in the 
Berbice region.  One aspect of this plan aimed to base salaries on productivity and 
profitability,292 while another aimed to replace the existing sugar levy by a dividend and 
taxes in order to provide a source of government revenue.293  A third aspect involved 
building new mills in Berbice.  Assistance in implementing this plan came in the form of 
a $6.4 billion loan received on concessional terms to finance the co-generation plant that 
will be a major part of the Skeldon Sugar Modernization Project (SSMP) in the Berbice 
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 region of Guyana.294  Cogeneration is a process by which waste energy is used to 
produce electricity.  At Skeldon, boilers and generators form the basis of this new p
Specifically, the boilers will be able to burn both fuel and bagasse, a waste product, 
thereby producing up to 10 more Megawatts of electricity.
roject.  
n 
ra region.    
                                                
295  A contract was signed with 
China National Technical Import and Export Corporation (CNTIC) for the construction 
of this project, which is scheduled to be completed in 2007.296  Part of the plan at 
Skeldon was to build on its current success by erecting a new factory and co-generatio
plant, improving productivity throughout its operations, diversifying, adding value 
though its branded sugars (such as Demerara Gold brand) and alcohol production, while 
expanding its markets in CARICOM and elsewhere. A fourth aspect of the PRSC plan 
was to close the sugar mills in the Demera
 
Effects of SAPs on Sugar Industry 
 
The implementation of these SAPs in the sugar industry has produced negative as 
well as potentially positive effects.  For example, the new factory at Skeldon will have a 
production capacity of 110,000 tonnes annually, which is nearly three times the capacity 
of the previous factory.  This will increase annual national production by more than 
450,000 tonnes.297  With production scheduled to come online by January 2008, the 
success of this project could determine whether or not it will be one of the positive 
reforms that has resulted from SAPs.   
 Since Guyana implemented SAPs in 1989, the sugar industry has achieved a 
“gradual trend of improving performance, both from the point of view of production and 
productivity.”298  Hewitt believes that the structural adjustment requirement of 
establishing a floating exchange rate (which led to a depreciation of the Guyanese dollar) 
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 was actually beneficial to the sugar industry.  It increased Guyana’s export earnings 
because the new floating exchange rate allowed the transmission of “powerful investment 
signals from high preferential sugar prices to the domestic economy.”299  Accompanying 
an increase in export earnings was an increase in the operating budget and thus a 
newfound ability to enhance and enlarge the workforce.  Additionally, non-quantitative 
trade barriers were reduced and rationalized.  These policies gave GUYSUCO greater 
access to equipment and as a result company began to rehabilitate its infrastructure.300   
   In spite of this, however, the SAPs implemented in the sugar industry did produce 
negative effects on the economy, especially in the areas of employment levels and sugar 
prices. These negative effects were most obvious between 1993 and 1998, when the 
GUYSUCO workforce was reduced from 27,000 to 20,000.301  In 1997, the Guyanese 
government, in order to mitigate the effects of the lay-offs, enacted legislation. 
Specifically, it mandated provisions for severance packages, which included pay of two 
to three weeks' wages per year worked, depending on the number of years in 
employment.302  Such legislation should have been enacted much earlier in order to avoid 
the massive unemployment and strikes that initially followed the lay-offs.  Strikes 
negatively affect productivity in the sugar industry, especially when workers spend 
substantially less time on their jobs due to participating in strikes.  
Additionally, workers were detrimentally affected by the lowering of production 
costs.  The ERP required that Guyana be able to produce sugar at internationally 
competitive prices, and in order to achieve this, production costs needed to be lowered.  
Since labour costs represented a substantial percentage (50-55 percent) of the production 
costs, labour shedding was inevitable and the remaining employees received a reduction 
in non-salary benefits.303 Additionally, the introduction of more mechanization increased 
labour productivity.304                   
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  Not only have workers been negatively affected, but in late 2005, Guyana’s 
efforts as part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group (ACP) to get the EU to change 
its mind about making a 36 percent cut in sugar prices over four years was unsuccessful. 
The EU market is part of the Sugar Protocol (SP).  Established in 1975, it allows the EU 
to purchase and import specific quantities of cane sugar from African Caribbean Pacific 
(ACP) countries, of which Guyana is a member.  Each country is assigned a quota.  
Guyana’s quota is 165,000 metric tonnes white sugar and is the third highest among the 
ACP countries.305  Export earnings (though considerably less) are derived also from 
sugar exports to the US preferential market, where the quota is only 24,310 tons.306 
                                                
 In a move to comply with global trade rules of liberalization, Guyana is 
scheduled to lose preferential treatment in the EU by October 2009.307  This will occur 
because having a preferential market directly counters neoliberal policies of free trade.  
Since 2005, Guyana has been losing US$37 million in revenues annually.308  The 
Guyanese government, however, believes it will be able to offset this loss due to a $6.4 
billion loan they received on concessional terms to finance the co-generation plant that 
will be a major part of the Skeldon sugar modernization project in Berbice.309  Further, 
President Jagdeo recently stated that he wanted to sue the EU in order to “test the 
protocol as a long-term legal agreement that was concluded between Europe and the 
ACP.”310                                                                                                                
 Regardless of whether the government sues or not, the fact remains that the 
ramifications of ending the EU agreement will most likely be detrimental to Guyanese 
society and economy.  The labor intensive nature of the industry coupled with Guyana’s 
high unemployment rates can lead to an inability to absorb the shock that would result 
from a closed sugar industry, thus stunting economic growth.311    
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 As of last December, however, all Cariforum (Caricom and the Dominican 
Republic) countries, reached an agreement with the European Union, that, with a 
temporary exception for rice and sugar, all exports and goods will be entitled to duty-free 
and quota-free access in Europe under the first ever Economic Partnership Agreement.  
This agreement also holds that in 2010, rice and sugar will be eligible for duty-free and 
quota-free access on Europe’s markets.312 
Concerning the closure of the Demerara Estates, another stipulation for the 
GUYSUCO modernization project, a study was conducted in 2002 on sugar industry 
workers to assess the short to medium term well-being of sugar industry employees.  
Called the Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA), this effort was spearheaded by 
the World Bank, and was included in their PRSC loan documents. The PSIA’s results 
were not favourable, suggesting that the most devastating effects of the sugar industry 
would be experienced in the Demerara region, if the sugar mills there were not made 
more profitable.  Failure to achieve this would lead to their closure.  They determined 
that the job losses resulting from such a closure would affect not only the sugar workers, 
but also those workers employed in the service sectors built up around the sugar industry.   
Additionally, as the social provider for workers and their communities, 
GUYSUCO provides services in health, education and housing.  Therefore, in addition to 
the job losses, the workers will also lose these services.  Another negative impact of 
modernization (downsizing and closing unproductive areas) will be the liberalization of 
the sugar price in Guyana.  This will lead to an increase in general prices and a net 
welfare loss for the poor.313  This is because opening up prices to free market control 
tends to lead to a general increase in prices. 
Compounding the employment and pricing problems is the fact that Booker Tate 
Ltd. has a tense relationship with the Guyanese government.  The lack of trust between 
the two and has led to inaction by both sides.314   It could be argued, however, that in fact 
this situation has resulted from inaction.  The government has been unable to acquire 
equipment that is urgently required.  The management of Booker Tate believes that this 
                                                 
312 Rickey Singh, “Caribbean in Historic Deal with the EU,” Trinidad Express, December 17, 2007, 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=161251342 (Accessed January 20, 2008).   
313 MacCuish, “Guyana: Experience of Economic Reform,” 14.   
314 MacCuish, “Guyana: Experience of Economic Reform,” 13.   
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 inability is due to the government’s refusal to solicit private investment for this new 
equipment.  Presumably, however, the government may simply be unable to acquire this 
access due to cost and other variables. 
 
Reforms  
  
Reforms to alleviate the negative impacts of SAPs in the sugar industry have not 
been as forthcoming as in the logging and mining industries.  However, it is noteworthy 
to mention one ongoing form of resistance, which can certainly lead to reforms.  It was 
framed as a result of the negative impacts on the sugar industry.  For instance, in response 
to the numerous layoffs, the Guyana Agricultural and General Workers’ Union (GAWU), 
which has been associated with the sugar workers since Cheddi Jagan’s early years in 
politics, has been very active in resisting the layoffs, and the cutting of health, transport 
and social benefits.  The policy recommendations of the SAPs do not provide 
remunerations for the losses that result from their modernization policies, such as the 
Skeldon modernization project in Berbice.  These should be enacted in order to prevent 
the economy from initially plummeting, while it is in transition under structural 
adjustment.   
 
Conclusion 
 
   The policy prescriptions of neoliberalism call for, among other things, the 
removal of global trade barriers, increased privatization, and limited government 
intervention.  These are the foundations of the structural adjustment packages designed 
by the IMF and World Bank for countries such as Guyana, which find themselves in 
economic crisis.   Even parties with socialist platforms, such as the PPP and PNC in the 
Guyanese context, had no choice but to enact these policies.  However, in spite of the 
economic improvement promised by these policies, as the Guyanese case shows, the 
economic decline continued. The ERP, HIPC and Enhanced HIPC were only mildly 
successful, and instead of engendering improvements, exacerbated the economic 
instability responsible for the cycle of underdevelopment.    
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 Specifically, due to the abundance of Guyana’s valuable timber, precious metals, 
and sugar, the IMF and World Bank targeted these industries for structural adjustment.  
Through SAPs, these industries were supposed to have the potential to increase economic 
profitability in Guyana and thus generate sufficient revenues to eliminate the debt and 
balance of payment problems, which initially led Guyana to implement SAPs.  While 
productivity was increased in all three sectors, the negative effects outweighed the 
positive ones, as massive unemployment, environmental degradation and further debt 
resulted.  Reforms, however, within Guyana and on the part of the IFI’s themselves, have 
been proposed in the wake of destruction caused by SAPs. Many of these are ongoing, 
and success rates will be determined with time, political will and policies.   
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 CHAPTER FOUR—CONCLUSION CHAPTER 
 
 
Guyana’s economy has experienced significant decline since the implementation 
of structural adjustment by the IMF and World Bank. As this analysis discusses, the 
decline can be seen in the general economic situation and in specific industries such as 
logging, mining and sugar.   
The thesis has been organized in such a way as to provide the historical context of 
the country’s economic and political development.  The objective for this historical 
overview is to highlight the role of the colonial powers in the rise of the two dominant 
political parties and in turn their impact on the nation’s economic direction.  Due to the 
British colonials’ meddling in the actions of the PPP and PNC, Guyana was unable to 
initially form a healthy political culture and a viable, productive economy.  Policies by 
both parties led to a later need for structural adjustment.  Through trade union activities 
such as fighting for the plights of poor sugar workers, Jagan founded the PPP, which, 
with underlying socialist principles, was supposed to improve Guyana’s economy.  The 
British did not find these doctrines suitable and therefore reassumed rule, later joining 
with the Americans in placing Burnham and his PNC in charge of the country.   
Both parties, following a worldwide trend, attempted to use socialism to correct 
the ills of society.   Burnham’s experiment of state socialism contained what he called 
surefire ways to boost the economy and make the small men real men.  This policy, 
however, was largely unsuccessful, mostly due to Burnham’s misuse of power.  Guyana’s 
economic situation became so dire, that it was at the mercy of the economic solutions 
proposed by the neoliberal agencies, the IMF and World Bank.  Despite Burnham’s 
commitment to socialism, this move was deemed essential in order to stabilize an 
economy spiraling downward.   Additionally, at that time, there was growing confidence 
around the globe in the abilities of neoliberal policies such as structural adjustment 
programs that could effect positive economic changes. 
Structural adjustment packages, namely the ERP, HIPC, and Enhanced HIPC 
were enacted to help repair the economy.  The remedies involve such prescriptions as 
privatization, trade liberalization, loan support, and strategies for reducing debt burdens 
and poverty. It involved increasing production capacity for the purposes of export in 
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 order to increase foreign currency earnings.  It was also supposed to industrialize the 
economy, a form of development that would also revolutionize the economy. Each 
successive program was designed to correct the ills of its predecessor, with the Enhanced 
HIPC containing provisions to allow the home country (in this case, Guyana) more 
control over the specifics of policies based on internal assessments performed by the 
government as well as communities.  These programs were applied to the economy as a 
whole, and as this paper has discussed, specifically to the logging, mining, and sugar 
industries, as these were potential sources for great economic gain due to the abundance 
of these materials in Guyana. 
Slight economic improvement was observed, but only in the short run.  With 
respect to the industries mentioned above, that is, logging, mining and sugar, structural 
adjustment led to degradation of the environment, physical and economic displacement of 
peoples, higher levels of poverty and debt, and a severe economic decline overall.  Racial 
tensions that have existed since the time of the country’s birth were seriously exacerbated 
by the economic problems.                
In light of the pressing problems identified here with the SAPs and the neoliberal 
program generally, it is imperative that reforms are implemented in order to stall and if 
possible, reverse this deterioration.  The first act of recourse must come from the IMF 
and World Bank themselves, as they are the entities that have historically enacted policies 
to eliminate debt and improve economies by relying on their own expertise and their 
claims of objectivity, 315 yet they have proven to be unsuccessful.  This has led to 
legitimacy dilemmas, which center on whether the IMF should be the sole arbitrator of 
policies and whether its authority is justifiable or sustainable.316   
The IFIs have sought to respond to these criticisms by encouraging and promoting 
more country ownership of the adjustment policies.  This, however, has not so far been a 
sufficient reform effort, as this innovation has produced mixed results.  Since there seems 
to be no end in sight to the cycle of incurring and paying off debt, perhaps the entire debt 
should be forgiven, which will grant these countries a clean slate and provide a fresh 
economic start. However, the impetus for alleviating these problems does not rest only on 
                                                 
315 Best, 471.  
316 Best, 472.     
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 the shoulders of the IMF and World Bank, but also on those of Guyanese political parties 
and their attendant agencies working in cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations.  
A recent proposal developed by Jagdeo offers hope for this method of alleviation.  
It deals with the issues of deforestation and poverty. Emphasizing that poor countries 
should be rewarded for avoiding deforestation, he believes that the rain forest in an asset 
in the fight against climate change, and should be safeguarded by the British government 
and NGO’s through bilateral investments in conservation and sustainable development.  
Britain is actively considering the proposal.  Opinions on the matter vary.  A Guyanese 
resident agreed with Jagdeo’s idea, finding it preferable to the deforestation that is 
usually a requisite for aid.  Mr. Robert Corbin, current leader of the PNC, believes 
however, that a multilateral approach, rather than an exclusive appeal to Guyana’s former 
colonial master should have been pursued and that this is simply a return to colonialism 
and will not benefit Guyana in the long run.  Mr. Gobin, leader of the Iwokrama project, 
thinks that approaching Britain was a good move, since they have been one of the leaders 
in debt relief for developing countries.317    
Additionally, this study has highlighted areas within Guyanese society that 
require immediate attention, in particular the racial tensions that have existed since the 
time of colonialism, which have caused significant harm to the political sector and the 
society as a whole.  These tensions must be reduced, and hopefully one day resolved, as 
the political parties attempt to work together more harmoniously, immune from 
manipulation by external forces. Both parties have already attempted to bridge the racial 
divide.  For example, the PPP has incorporated the word ‘Civic’ into the name of the 
party, in addition to attracting leadership from the opposite race, while the PNC has 
incorporated the word ‘Reform’ into its name, and recruited Indo-Guyanese leadership.  
Additional societal, sociological, and political measures must be implemented in this area 
to ensure the creation of harmony among all the ethnicities within Guyanese society.   
The political parties are not the only ones responsible for promoting these 
attitudes.  Since the colonial era, such racial tensions have been deeply ingrained within 
the psychological and cultural threads of Guyana’s society.  Positive reforms by the 
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political parties towards unraveling these threads are certainly helpful, but these changes 
need to take root in other levels of society as well.  Changing these attitudes must begin 
in homes, schools, and religious and civil society organizations.  Since these are the 
grassroots of society, they are the ideal settings for ingraining an effective level of 
positive, accepting attitudes regarding ethnicity that encompasses more than mere 
tolerance.  Citizens can then begin to incorporate these attitudes into Guyana’s political 
sphere.     
Lessons learned in Guyana have global implications as well.  This is because in 
our increasingly interconnected global society, countries have become more dependent 
on each other for natural resources.  However, in light of improper regulations, 
inadequate infrastructure, and the destructive methods of extraction and environmental 
negligence, serious coherent, consideration must be given to the dire consequences of 
SAPs when it comes to the issue of permanent depletion of resources, not only in Guyana 
but in other developing countries as well.  With limited resources left to trade, a country 
might eventually be removed entirely from the global trading system.  Therefore, if 
ignored, the current failures of the neoliberal agenda could also lead to the worsening of 
development problems in other countries where structural adjustment has been 
implemented.     
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